Danish Leopard tanks have been in the training area in Latvia to conduct live-fire exercises as part of Forward Land Forces Team 2 (FLF 2) – Denmark’s contribution to NATO’s collective defense in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. October 3, 2025. Photo: Magnus Terp/The Danish Armed Forces. Source: The Danish Defence Gallery.
By Kaare G. Kieler [1]
The SCM challenge
The war in Ukraine has illuminated that, in conflict and war, NATO will require the ability to sustain a large military force in the Baltics and Finland for an extended period of time. The availability of ammunition, equipment, spare parts, and fuel will be a key challenge, making the design of integrated supply chains a critical success factor.
The NATO force will need to be supplied by many different vendors mostly chosen by the national organizations – from overseas allied countries (US, Canada) as well as from European allies (UK, Finland, Germany, Poland, the Baltics and the Scandinavian countries). There will be a lack of product standardization across countries, as well as challenges for the integration of local organizations and IT systems. Furthermore, the critical warehouses, port facilities, and main transport routes will be continuously challenged by the enemy especially by drones, making steady supplies uncertain.
If we look back to the last great war in Europe in terms of World War 2 the allied planners when planning for D-Day in 1944, had joint integrated planning, complete product standardization within the British and American sectors respectively, and full control of both sea and air, securing the supply lanes.
In comparison, supplying a multinational NATO forces in the Baltic and Finland in case of a war against Russia, we face the risk of a very high and unpredictable variation across all parts of the supply chain – potentially resulting in a prohibitive demand for safety stocks and buffer resources.
In this article, application of the Supply Chain Management (SCM) approach poses as a basis for a discussion. In the private sector, this approach is widely applied to optimize the flow of physical items from the production lines through a complex supply chain to the customers. The required service levels are quantified – typically in terms of product availability and delivery time – and through modelling and analysis, the most efficient way of using both internal and external resources is determined.
As no open-source data is available, this article will apply basic SCM concepts to narrow down the key issues that must be addressed when planning supplies to the battle stations in the Baltics and Finland.
Firstly, the key SCM service concepts are introduced, and their relevance for supplying military forces is discussed. Secondly, the “footprint” of warehouses, transport, and inventory is discussed. Finally, an estimated timeline and an action plan for getting ready for 2026 is outlined.
SCM service criteria for winning the war
From a business point of view, the service criteria to be met when supplying the Baltics are not unique. The main success criteria can be seen as “generic,” similar to those of any multinational SCM organization operating in a competitive environment. There may be specific military requirements, but these can be addressed within the generic framework.
Adapted to a military context, the criteria for success can be defined as follows:
Firstly, joint SCM must ensure that supply levels do not fall below critical levels which could bring bridgeheads and the main defence lines at risk. In operational terms, this means that parameters must be set with high safety levels across all critical categories of items, services, and capacities. The commercial terms for this would be that “no backorders” are accepted.
Secondly, joint SCM must enable a continuous high battle intensity – i.e. an intensity sufficiently high to wear down the enemy while allowing commanders to actively exploit opportunities. In commercial terms, the equivalent would be ensuring resources to launch price and product campaigns when relevant from a business point of view. In operational terms this means that reorder quantities will be set at a high level and with high frequency.
Thirdly, joint SCM must enable a cost-effective supply chain – i.e. a supply chain that enables the member countries to finance and budget the costs over a long period of time. In commercial terms, this means that higher logistical unit costs than our competitors can only be accepted if they provide a superior service for which the customer is willing to pay.
Summing up, to be successful, joint SCM must provide high safety levels and frequent replenishment – chieved in a sustainable and cost-effective manner. Once again, such demands to a large multinational SCM organization are in no way unusual and would be familiar to most “Director of Operations” in large industry and retail organizations
The SCM “footprint” – key issues
A key focus area in supply chain management is the modelling of the “supply footprint,” i.e., finding the “total least-cost combination” of warehousing, inventory, and transport that meets the required competitive service levels. Each of the elements is discussed in the following:
In case of a prolonged conflict with Russia, distribution centres and depots along the approximately 1,300 km frontline will have to be supplied. There should be a sufficient number of depots to ensure that stock levels and inventories at the battle units can be kept to a minimum.
As discussed, the supplies will originate from a very large number of different vendors, chosen by each of the host countries. Central warehouses for each of the major categories must be established to ensure coordinated deliveries to the depots. Ideally, they should be located in well-protected areas with organized inbound transport from the major vendors. Practical solutions for inventory management and packaging at these warehouses should also be established.
The shipping lanes supplying the depots must be planned and set up. The key and decisive constraint is here the availability of the receiving harbours in the Baltics and Finland. Thus, the depth, loading/unloading, and distribution capacity for harbours like Helsinki, Tuku, Tallinn must be planned and optimized – as well as the use of harbours like Hamburg, Gothenburg, Esbjerg, and Aarhus as outward shipping locations.
Land-based transport lanes from warehouse to depots by truck and train through Sweden and Poland will be expected to handle significant quantities – but often over long distances and with long lead times. The focus of this planning could be supplies from vendors in Germany and Eastern Europe and as an important backup in case of disruption of the shipping lanes.
For the depots both transportation, handling and inventory management must be prepared. A high number of distribution trucks must be available, the handling of pre-made boxes and cases must be planned, and procedures must be established.
Getting ready for joint SCM by the end of 2026
Given the complexity and tight timeline schedule, there will be no room for detailed and formalized top-down master planning – instead, a very pragmatic bottom-up approach is recommended.
2025 – Immediate establishment of a clear business case
To enable overall decision-making and effective management, a clear business case must be established. Using high-level data, it should document what is likely to happen if no action is taken and identify the most probable SCM scenarios to be addressed. If such documentation is not already in place, it should be developed without delay.
2025 - SCM requirements for each geographical area of military operation
Initial SCM planning for each geographical area of military operation should be carried out – this could be Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia – and perhaps for Finland divided into relevant areas. For each area the planned supply of the participating nations should be aligned and adjusted to the requirements of the military officer in command – and when available, with the active involvement of depot managers. Particular attention should be paid to the required safety levels and standardization.
To handle the high degree of uncertainty and need for manual replanning, robust and experienced depot and harbour managers will be critical – recruitment plans must be made and initiated immediately.
2025 – focus on standardization
The model calculations carried out show clearly that without a reasonable level of standardization, variation at the item level will be so high and unpredictable that the necessary safety levels simply cannot be reached.
Thus, standardization is mission critical.
Given the large number of items and categories, standardization must be supported by comprehensive databases in which items, product programs, and categories are consolidated. Given these tools, ad hoc working groups can be effective in a hands-on process to limit the number of variants. The techniques of substitution used in the spare parts industry, as well as the methods of categorization used in the retail industry, can be used as useful inputs.
2026 - Tender for the consolidated supply lanes and warehouses
Systematic utilization of industry resources will be essential. Market dialogue and mobilization should begin as soon as possible, and tenders should be executed during 2026.
A simple, consolidated database covering all operational areas should serve as the foundation for cooperation with industry and logistics providers. The database should provide an overview of volumes per vendor and category, an updated product catalogue, the geographical footprint of warehouses and transport lanes, and estimates of the required safety stock levels.
For indirect materials, large retail companies can be tasked with managing both sourcing, transportation, and warehousing.
The operational setup will, to a large extent, rely on manual procedures and workflows, as there will not be sufficient time to establish fully integrated transactional systems such as SAP. Therefore, manual processes must be developed, tested, and documented in advance. [2]
Conclusion - the call for SCM action
In his book “Supplying War,” Martin Creveld characterizes the planning for D Day and Normandy 1944 as “An Accountants” approach to warfare – allowing little room for flexibility or re-planning when needed. [3] The overall planning process was disconnected, and hands-on decisions made directly on the beaches soon took over. This ensured the initial supply, but the absence of coherent strategic planning significantly hindered and delayed the liberation of Europe.
Today, planners preparing for operations in the Baltics and Finland must aim for an open and coherent framework – one designed for contingencies and capable of continuous adaptation as events evolve. A systematic SCM approach, supported by modern IT tools and close cooperation between nations and industry, can make this ambition far more achievable even than it was in 1944.
Notes
[1] The author of this article has an extensive career working with large and complex supply chain projects, primarily in the private sector and mostly within a European context. The author is also well-read in military history. However, it should be emphasized that the author has no military background, no experience with Danish defense logistics, and no insight into the NATO organization. Furthermore, no classified, military, or detailed logistics data have been applied in this article.
[2] ERP systems such as SAP ensure integration and transaction handling across the supply chain but cannot manage the day-to-day dynamics and the constant need for detailed re-planning. In such cases, manual planning supported by specialized tools for replenishment, picking, and route scheduling must be applied, with updated parameters feeding back into the ERP system.
[3] Martin van Creveld, Supplying War, Cambridge University Press, New York 1977, pp- 202 -206.
