Peace Operations in Africa

While western foreign policy, security and media attention was on Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans over the last decade, Africa emerged as the major arena for United Nations (UN) peace operations[2]. Of the 17 peace operations currently managed by the UN, 8 is in Africa, of which 6 are large complex peace operations. This explains why 75% of the approximately 100,000 military, police and civilian UN peacekeepers currently deployed can be found in Africa. The emphasis on Africa is also reflected in the UN peacekeeping budget. Of the approximate $5.3 billion budgeted for 2007/2008 approximately 77% is budgeted for operations in Africa.[3]


Peace operations is also a dominant theme for the African Union (AU). Over the last half-decade the AU has undertaken three major peace operations of its own, in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia, involving approx. 12,000 peacekeepers at a total cost of approximately $700 million.[4] Africa is, of course, also a significant troop contributor to UN peace operations, with 34 African countries contributing approximately 28% of the UN’s uniformed peacekeepers.

In comparison with the small and weak UN missions of the mid- to late-1990s, the contemporary UN complex peace operations represent a significant shift in the political will of the international community to invest in peace operations in Africa, and to use the United Nations as the vehicle of choice for these type of operations.

This shift should not, however, be seen as a concerted effort by the international community to improve peace operations in the wake of the failures of the 1990s, although such an effort was indeed made within the UN[5]. The willingness to invest more than $5 billion in UN peace operations was generated in, and will be sustained by, the post-9/11 belief that failed states are ideal training, staging and breeding grounds for international terrorists[6]. This assumption is starting to be challenged, as there is little evidence linking either the identity of terrorists, or their training and staging grounds, with failed states, especially in Africa. Most terror attacks to date have been planned and staged from relatively stable states outside Africa, where international terrorists have access to modern information technology, international banking and international travel networks[7].

However, this assumption is still popular in security policy circles and in this context, a kind of informal peacekeeping Apartheid has come about, whereby most European and American peace operations and offensive forces are deployed in NATO or European Union (EU) operations in Europe and the Middle-East[8], whilst most UN peace operations troops are contributed by the developing world and deployed in Africa[9].

Whilst this division of roles reflect the macro-pattern, it masks an interesting sub-trend that has emerged over the last three years. Almost a decade after Somalia and Rwanda resulted in the West withholding its peacekeepers from the United Nations and Africa, we now see a new willingness to consider deploying European peacekeepers to Africa and as part of UN peace operations.

In 2003 the European Union (EU) deployed operation Artemis in Bunia, in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The success of this kind of focussed but robust intervention encouraged the EU to follow-up with further such missions[10]. Since June 2004, the EU deployed approximately 100 military and 50 police advisors in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and over the same period, have provided strategic airlift to over 2000 AMIS personnel[11]. In 2006 the EU deployed military and police missions to the DRC, this time in support of MONUC in the context of the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)[12]. These developments have opened up debate around Europe’s and NATO’s future defence and security policies towards Africa. Over the same period, a number of European countries have indicated a willingness to re-engage with UN peace operations, and as a result of the new UN mission in Lebanon, in the wake of the Israeli-Hezbollah war, there are now two European countries – France and Italy – in the top 15 UN Troop Contributing Countries[13].

Troop contributions, however, reflect only one form of support UN member states can show towards UN peace operations. The financing of UN and African peace operations reveal another. Through the assessed contribution system, the United States of America (USA) is responsible for 26% of the UN peace operations budget, while Europe’s combined contribution represents approximately 43%[14]. Together, America, Japan and Europe are responsible for approximately 88% of the UN peace operations budget.

America and Europe are also major financial contributors to African peace operations. In 2004 the EU contributed approximately €25 million to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and it has contributed approximately €435 million to AMIS since its inception in 2004[15]. Towards the end of 2005, bilateral contributions by individual EU member states amount to an additional approximately €115 million Euros[16]. The USA has contributed approximately $450 million to AMIS since the mission’s inception in 2004[17].

From a UN and African perspective, the USA and Europe thus have a major political and financial, influence on, and stake in, the future of peace operations in Africa. It is anticipated that they will have a continued interest in supporting the development of a balanced capacity to manage conflicts in Africa that will ensure that there is robustness at all levels - international, regional and sub-regional – in the international conflict management system.

United Nations Peace Operations

Contemporary UN complex peace operations are in effect peacebuilding operations, in that they have mandates that combine political, security, development, rule of law and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict[18].

The UN’s capability to undertake such system-wide peacebuilding operations is what sets it apart from NATO and the AU. The EU is the only other multilateral body that currently has the potential to develop such a complex peacebuilding operations capacity in the mid- to long-term, but it has not yet demonstrated its capacity to deploy such operations to date. The EU is also the only multilateral body that has the potential to integrate a sixth dimension, namely trade.

Integrated Missions

Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional framework has proven to be a daunting task for the UN[19]. In order to manage these interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the ‘Integrated Missions’ model that is essentially aimed at enhancing coherence between the UN Country Team, that is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN peace operation, that is peace and security focussed.

The Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan released a Note on Integrated Missions that describes the concept as follows: “An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.[20]” The current UN missions in Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia and Sudan, all have Integrated Mission management structures.

As with any new innovation, this model has not been without its detractors, and it has highlighted various technical, administrative, organizational and budgetary challenges, that need to be overcome before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented[21]. A comprehensive study[22] was commissioned and completed in May 2005, and as of December 2005, Integrated Missions has now been officially accepted as the mission structure of choice[23]. It will be the dominant management structure for UN complex peace operations in the near- to mid-term, and it is likely that the EU, AU and others will try to apply some of its core features to their own future missions.

The AU in particular has started to adopt some of the integrated missions terminology into its evolving African Standby Force concepts[24]. However, it is important to distinguish between the scope for integration that exists within the UN System and that of the African Union. Whilst it is possible, under certain circumstances, to integrate the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) function with UN peace operations to establish an UN ‘Integrated Mission’ in the system-wide coherence context, it is inconceivable that the UN RC/HC function can be integrated with the AU, EU, NATO, or any other non-UN peace operation, because the humanitarian and development coordination mandate has been entrusted to the UN System because of its unique position in the international body politic[25]. This does not imply that the UN development and humanitarian community, and others such as the AU, EU and NATO, can not coordinate closely or even, under certain circumstances, cooperate, but it is inconceivable that they can be ‘integrated’ in the same technical system-wide meaning that this concept implies in the UN System context.

Instead, integration in the AU context is used in a generic sense to refer to multi-dimensional coordination and cooperation. For instance, the AU’s ‘Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF)’ refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are combined in one process[26], as opposed to the UN’s ‘Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)’ that refers to the coming together of planners from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and planners from the UN Development Group (UNDG), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other UN agencies, i.e. a system-wide initiative. Integration in the AU and other non-UN contexts should thus be understood as combining certain functions, typically the military, police and civilian (which includes substantive and mission support functions) in multi-dimensional or complex operations.

Use of Force

Another trend is the new more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although contemporary UN complex peace operations in Africa[27] are still grounded in, and characterized by, the core principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice, have undergone significant development.

Consent still implies that the parties to the conflict must invite the UN presence and agree on its role, but it is now recognized that strategic consent at the level of the leadership of the parties to the conflict does not necessarily translate into operational and tactical consent at all levels in the field.

Impartiality still implies that UN peace operations will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict, but does not imply that the UN will stand-by when civilians are in imminent threat of danger (if the mission has a civilian protection mandate), nor that it will not record and report (for instance to the International Criminal Court) human rights abuses that may have or are still taking place, including by the parties to the conflict.

Minimum use of force still implies that UN peace operations will use the minimum use of force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is now understood that UN peace operations should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including to those it has been mandated to protect.

It is unlikely, for the foreseeable future, that the UN Security Council will deploy new complex peace operations in Africa, or elsewhere, without mandates that reflect this new interpretation and contain elements of Chapter seven’s enforcement authority.

Collaborative Offensive Operations

One of the innovations that emerged out of the nexus between peacebuilding and robust peace operations in the context of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), is collaborative offensive operations. MONUC is operating along-side, and in support of, the integrated brigades of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the FARDC), in offensive operations aimed at protecting civilians and forcefully disarming armed groups.

Some of the collaborative offensive operations undertaken to date had the desired effect in that they have resulted in larger numbers of combatants entering the disarmament process. However, these operations have also raised various technical, budgetary and administrative challenges. The most serious concerns relate to the unintended consequences[28] generated by these UN directed and supported actions, including the impact of the predatory behaviour of some of the FARDC troops on the populations where they have been deployed, and the human rights abuses and internal displacements that have come about as a result.

Civil Protection

Another interesting example of the trend towards greater synergy and cohesion across the traditional security and development divide is the way in which civil protection is emerging as a common theme for both the humanitarian and peace operations community. Since 1999, seven UN peace operations  - Burundi, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan -  have been mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.[29] In 2005, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination (RC/HC) of the UN Observation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ross Mountain, took the initiative to establish a Protection Working Group that explored the potential of using protection as a common theme among the military, police and civilian peacekeepers and the humanitarian community[30]. After a successful pilot period in North Kivu the concept was broadened to the rest of the country. Similar initiatives are underway in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Civil protection it set to become one of the dominant themes of UN peace operations in the short- to medium term.

African Peace Operations

Over the past half-decade, the AU, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC, have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations. The AU, in particular, has played a leading role by deploying its’ first three peace operations, AMIB in Burundi,  AMIS in Darfur and AMISOM in Somalia[31].

One of the most significant developments in the African context is the informal division of roles that has emerged around the sequencing of peace operations. The pattern that is taking shape is that the AU, or one of the RECs, first deploy a stabilization operation, followed by a UN complex peace operation within approximately 90 to 120 days.

The UN/AU Partnership

This pattern was established in Burundi, where the AU deployed AMIB in 2003 followed by a UN operation (ONUB) in 2004; and repeated in Liberia, where ECOWAS deployed ECOMIL in 2003, followed by a UN operation (UNMIL) later in the same year. A slightly different partnership is developing in Darfur where the political context prevents the AU from handing over the mission to the UN, and instead a new hybrid AU/UN relationship has developed in stages, starting with a UN light and later heavy support package to AMIS, and then transitioning into a fully fledged AU/UN hybrid mission (UNAMID) that took over from AMIS on 1 January 2008[32]. In the case of Somalia the AU Peace and Security Council has initially limited its mission (AMISOM) to a 6-month mandate, with the expectation that the UN will take over the mission. Although the UN has not taken over the mission, and it unlikely to do so until stability has been restored, it is another clear example of the expectation that AU stability operations will be followed by a more peacebuilding focussed UN operation.

This sequencing of operations appears to work well because it plays on the respective strengths of the UN, AU and RECs. The UN is adverse to deploying peace operations into situations where a comprehensive peace agreement is not yet in place, and when it does receive the green light to deploy, it needs approximately 90 days to muster the political process necessary to plan, organize and deploy a complex peace operation[33].

African regional organizations, on the other hand, seem to more readily willing to undertake stabilization operations, especially when they have been involved in brokering a cease-fire, and feel obliged to build on that momentum. And although the AU and some of the RECs are capable of deploying military forces that can achieve limited stabilization mandates, they generally lack the staying power and multi-dimensional capability of the UN, that is needed to transition from a security focussed stabilization mission to a complex peacebuilding mission.

It is anticipated that this pattern of sequencing will continue into the mid- to longer term. It will be very useful for all concerned, however, if this unofficial division of labour could be formalised through some form of cooperation agreement between the UN and the AU, as this would then enable all stakeholders to conduct a much more focussed capacity building effort[34].

Capacity Building

Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place than at any other time since the OAU was founded in 1963[35]. Many of the new structures, however, still need to become fully operational[36].

One of the most important shortcomings of the AU is the lack of institutional capacity, especially the human resources, to adequately develop policy, plan and manage peace operations[37]. The AU only have a handful of staff dedicated to managing peace operations, significantly less than their UN and EU counterparts. It would be important for donors interested in investing in African peace operations capacity to understand that the investment in training and equipping peacekeepers will be unsustainable if it is not matched by a proportionate investment in developing an appropriate headquarter capacity[38].

The African Standby Force

One of the most significant developments in the African peace operations context is the initiative to develop an African Stand-by Force (ASF)[39]. It is significant because, for the first time, Africa now has a common position, and action plan, for the development of its peace operations capacity. This means that the various disparate donor initiatives to enhance Africa’s peace operations capacity can be positively channelled to support one coherent effort[40].

Although considerable progress has been achieved since the ASF concept was approved in 2004, the operationalisation of the ASF has been slower than anticipated, and has been predominantly focussed on the military aspects of peace operations. One of the key remaining challenges is the need to equally develop the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF framework so that the multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU peace operations concept[41].

The Financing of African Peace Operations

The single most important factor when considering the future of peace operations in Africa is financing. The AU experience is that even relatively small unarmed military observer missions have proven to costly to be financed solely from its own budget or from the African Peace Fund[42]. Instead the AU, and the OAU before it, has to rely on donor funding to finance its peace missions.[43]

The AU’s first peace operation, AMIB, had an approved strength of just over 3,000 troops and an operational budget of approximately $130 million per year. This was a significant expense in the African context, for instance in comparison, the budget of the AU Commission for 2003 was approximately $32 million.

The AU’s second peace operation, AMIS, was even larger still with approximately 6700 personnel and it had an annual budget of approximately $466 million. AMIS is was also donor funded, and as indicated earlier, the EU and the USA have contributed the bulk of the missions’ budget[44].

As can be seen from these two examples, it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, the AU will be dependent on donor support for its peace operations. This is problematic, because the AU’s dependency on external resources denies it the freedom to independently take decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peace operations it may wish to undertake[45]. Finding the appropriate balance between African and partner interests will thus probably be the dominant feature of the relations between these partners over the short- to medium term.

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[1] Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow at the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

[2] This paper will use the term peace operations in its generic form, i.e. to refer to the whole spectrum of operations (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) authorized by the United Nations to monitor ceasefire agreements and/or to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, including those aspects of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction that fall within the domain of the UN’s new integrated missions concept.

[3] All the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations statistics in this paper was calculated from the DPKO Background Note of  30 November 2007,, accessed on 8 February 2008.

[4] For AMIS statistics see ACCORD’s Conflict Trends magazine Issue 4/2005,, accessed on 20 May 2006. For AMIB see Festus Aboagye’s ‘The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation’, in Conflict Trends, Issue 2/2004,, accessed on 20 May 2006.

[5] See for instance the UN peacekeeping reform efforts of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the form of the reports he commissioned on the Fall of Srebrenica (General Assembly, A/54/549 of 15 November 1999), and the Genocide in Rwanda (Report of the Independent Inquiry on the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999, United Nations, New York) and the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/502 of 20 October 2000), the so-called Brahimi report.

[6] See James Traub, ‘Making Sense of the Mission’, New York Times Magazine, 11 April 2004; Simon Chesterman’s “Bush, the United Nations and Nation-building” in Survival, Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2004, p. 105; and Bruce Jones, 2004, Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications and Responses, United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practise Unit, New York.

[7] Gregg Mills & Jeffrey Herbst, “Africa, Terrorism and AFRICOM, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Research (RUSI), April 2007, Vol. 152 No. 2, pp. 40-44.

[8] Cedric de Coning, ‘An African Perspective on United Nations Reform’ (Un Point De Vue Africain), Revue Agir, No. 22, May 2005, pp. 126-132.

[9] The top 15 troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations as of 31 January 2008 were: (1) Pakistan – 10,173; (2) Bangladesh – 9,675; (3) India – 9,471; (4) Nigeria – 5,571; (5) Nepal – 3,675; (6) Jordan – 3,582; (7) Ghana – 3,399;  (8) Rwanda – 2,984; (9) Uruguay – 2,593;  (10) Italy – 2,565; (11) Senegal – 2,560; (12) China – 1,963; (13) South Africa – 1,888; (14) Ethiopia – 1,820; and (15) France – 1,803. See DPKO Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations as of 31 January 2008,, accessed on 8 February 2008.

[10] A report on the lessons learned from Operation Artemis is available at:, accessed on 21 May 2006.

[11] For the EU Council position on Sudan and support to AMIS see of 15 May 2006, accessed on 21 May 2006. For a critical review of the AU/EU partnership in Darfur, see the International Crisis Group’s Africa Report N°99 of 25 October 2005, at, accessed on 21 May 2006. Total numbers from EU Delegation to Washington D.C. Fact Sheet, December 2007,­web/HotTopics/Da­rfur­EU­FactsheetDec2007.doc, accessed on 10 February 2008.

[12] For more information on the mandate, structure and budget of the Eufor R.D. Congo, see the Joint Action approved by the Council of the European Union on 27 April 2006,­/l_116/l_1162006042..., accessed on 21 May 2006.

[13] See footnote 8 for a list of the top 15 Troop Contribution Countries.

[14] Germany contributes 9%, the UK, France and Italy each 7%, Spain 3%, the Netherlands 2% and Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Denmark and Finland 1% each. See UN DPKO Fact Sheet, DPI/2429 of May 2006.

[15] EU Delegation to Washington D.C. Fact Sheet, December 2007,, accessed on 10 February 2008.

[16] EU Delegation to Washington D.C. Fact Sheet, December 2007, see footnote 14.

[17] US State Department Fact Sheet on U.S. Aid to the People of Sudan, dated 25 August 2006,, and press statement welcoming UNAMID,, both accessed on 10 February 2008.

[18] This description of peacebuilding was first formulated by the author and Senzo Ngubane for an ACCORD study on Peacebuilding in Southern Africa commissioned by JICA in 2004. It was subsequently further refined by the author for the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework developed by ACCORD for the Peace and Security Programme of the NEPAD Secretariat (NEPAD, 2005).

[19] Uvin, P. 2002, “The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms”, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.5.

[20] United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2005, paragraph 4. See also the Revised Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, dated 17 January 2006, and released under a Note from the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006, paragraph 4.

[21] Amongst others: Dahrendorf, N. 2003, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change, King’s College, London; Porter, T. 2002, An External Review of the CAP, OCHA, New York; Sommers, Marc. 2000, The Dynamics of Coordination, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper #40, Providence; Stockton, N. 2002, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Kabul; Donini, A. 2002, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda, Occasional Paper #22, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence; Reindorp, N. & Wiles, P. 2001, Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience, A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, and Duffield, M., Lautze S. & Jones, B. 1998, Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996-1997, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), New York.

[21] Smith, D. 2003, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding, PRIO, Oslo, p.16.

[22] Barth Eide, E, Kaspersen, A.T, Kent, R. & von Hippel, K. 2005, Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, Independent Study of the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, NUPI, Oslo.

[23] “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions”, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 9 December 2005.

[24] The African Union has embarked on an initiative to develop an African Standby Force in May 2003 when the first ASF Policy Framework was adopted by the 3rd meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, and endorsed by the Maputo Summit in July 2003. The concept has subsequently been further developed through a series of workshops in 2005 and 2006 that looked at doctrine, training and evaluation, logistics, standing operating procedures, and command, control and communications.

[25] General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 14 April 1992.

[26] “Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force”, African Union Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), 1 September 2006.

[27] MONUC (DRC) since December 1999 and in 2007 approximately 20,812 personnel and a budget of $1,2 billion; ONUB (Burundi) since June 2004 and in 2006 approximately 4,384 personnel and a budget of $308 million; UNMIL (Liberia) since September 2003 and in 2007 approximately 17,406 personnel and a budget of $760 million; UNMIS (Sudan) since March 2005 and in 2007 approximately 11,277 personnel and a budget of  $969 million; UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire) since April 2004 with and in 2007 approximately 8,528 personnel and a budget of $438 million and UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) that was established in October 1999 and used to be the largest UN peacekeeping operation with almost 18,000 personnel and an annual budget of approximately $720 million,  but have now been downsized and transformed into a peacebuilding office UNIOSIL as of 1 January 2006 with 188 personnel.

[28] Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds), “The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations”, United Nations University Press, 2007,Tokyo.

[29] See Victoria K. Holt, ‘The Military and Civilian Protection: Developing Roles and Capacities’ in Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmar, “Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations”, HPG Report 21, March 2006 (

[30] Author interviews and correspondence with Paul Bonard, Senior Protection Adviser to DSRSG RC/HC, MONUC, 2005 and 2006.

[31]  The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had approximately 8,000 personnel and its budget for 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 was approximately US$ 466 million. The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) had approximately 3335 personnel and its budget for 2004 was approximately US$ 134 million. Refer to footnote 3.

[32] See the Human Rights Watch report, ‘Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change -
The African Union Mission in Sudan’, Vol.18, No.1 (A) of January 2006, at, accessed on 21 May 2006.

[33] de Coning, C.H. “A Peacekeeping Stand-By System for SADC: Implementing the African Stand-By Force Framework in Southern Africa”, in Anne Hammerstad (ed.), People, States and Regions: Building a Co-operative Security Regime in Southern Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 2005, Johannesburg.

[34] NEPAD, African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework,­, acces­sed on 22 May 2006.

[35] See, for instance, the Africa Leadership Forum’s Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa. Kampala: Africa Leadership Forum, 1991; and Amoo SG, ‘The OAU and African conflicts: Past successes, present paralysis and future perspectives’. Washington DC: Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 1992.

[36] Bakwesegha CJ, ‘The need to strengthen regional organizations: A rejoinder’, Security Dialogue, 24, 4, 1993, pp.377–81.

[37] Berman E & K Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2000.

[38] African Union, Draft Policy Framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development,­ces/Past­/2006­/February..., accessed on 22 May 2006.

[39] African Union (AU), Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part 1), 12–14 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Exp/ASF-MSC/2(1); see­AF/Reg­Org/unity_to_union/aurep.htm.

[40] de Coning, C.H. “Towards a Common Southern African Peacekeeping System”, in Solomon, H. (ed.), Towards a Common Defence and Security Policy in the Southern African Development Community, Africa Institute, 2004, Pretoria.

[41] De Coning, C.H., “Towards a Civilian Component for the African Stand-by Force”, Center for International Political Studies (CiPS) E-Briefing Paper No 58/2005, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

[42] The OAU and AU have undertaken eight limited observer missions in five countries, and two peacekeeping missions, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to date. The AU is also currently managing a military supported election monitoring mission in the Comoros. ‘The observer missions were: 1. Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I, Rwanda, 1991–Jul 93, 57 MLOs, budget not known);  2. Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II, Rwanda, Aug–Oct 93, 70 MLOs, budget not known);  3. OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB, Dec 93–Jul 96, 47 MLOs, estimated budget of $1,136,345); 4. OAU Mission in Comoros I (OMIC I, Oct 97–May 98, 20 MLOs, estimated budget of $1,414,253, excluding repatriation bill of $40,700); 5. OAU Mission in Comoros II (OMIC II, Dec 01–Feb 02, 14 MLOs, estimated budget of $105,000); 6. OAU Mission in Comoros III (OMIC III, Mar–May 02, 30 MLOs and 9 technicians, estimated budget of $305,000); 7. Joint Monitoring Commission (DRC, Nov 99–Nov 00, 33 Neutral Investigators, and 10 JMC members, estimated budget of $3 million for first year, excluding $7.7 million for Facilitator); and 8. OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE, Aug 00 to date, 13 MLOs and military staff and 21 civilian staff, estimated budget of about $3 million as of December 2002).’ See African Union, Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I1 - Annexes), 12–14 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Exp/ASF-MSC/2(1);  a copy can be found at, accessed on 25 May 2006.

[43] See African Union, Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I1 - Annexes), 12–14 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Exp/ASF-MSC/2(1);  a copy can be found at, accessed on 25 May 2006.

[44] See footnote 3.

[45] de Coning, C.H. “The Role of the OAU in Conflict Management in Africa, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peace-Building”, in Lessons for Africa from a Seminar Past, ISS Monograph Series, No. 10, April 1997, Midrand,, accessed on 25 May 2006.