Operationalizing Battlespace Agility
Battlespace agility is a Danish developed warfighting concept that is simply defined as the speed at which the warfighting organisation is able to transform knowledge into actions for desired effects in a battlespace and has its origins in the application of constructivism in intelligence analysis and operational planning.1 This article will present the origins of this concept and discuss fundamental components of this concept and how they affect our understanding of how we effectively fight wars in the 21st century. It begins with a conceptual breakdown of modern battlespace that accounts for the changes in information technology, and the resulting supercharged importance of understanding the cognitive domain for battlespace management. This is followed by a presentation of ‘agility’ research built on over a decade of international transformation studies, experimentation, and lessons learned from the field. It is from this body of research that the Danish concept of battlespace agility emerges in 20082, founded on the renewed focus on the quality of sensemaking through military intelligence support to Commanders in a battlespace. The argument made in this short article is simple: That in an age of split-second knowledge development, sharing, and exploitation, the onus is on military intelligence to provide the best situational awareness and understanding to Commanders at all levels, to inform military action. As a consequence, military intelligence will be a defining capacity for successful warfighting in the 21st century. In this regard, recent Danish efforts to reinvigorate the scope and quality of military intelligence, is contributing to the delineation of Danish approach to warfighting that pursues battlespace agility.
The need for military operational agility has recently been reflected publically in the transformation policies of several countries, and is the result of a decade’s worth of international research.3 The objective of this article is to introduce readers to the concept of battlespace agility, an emerging principle for effective warfighting in 21st century environments driven by Royal Danish Defense College (RDDC) contributions to US and NATO applied research regimes. Its origins lie in 20 years of agility related research developed in various international forums and bodies examining the dramatic changes in the environments in which militaries must fight.
The article is divided into three main sections and a conclusion. The first describes the fundamental changes in our understanding of the warfighting environment, and the emergence of greater complexities that surround how modern militaries conduct operations. In the modern warfighting environment, the primacy of physical action is giving way to the primacy of the discourse surrounding those actions. Whether it is a Campaign Plan or direct action in a high value target in some distant mountain range, actions have become navigational buoys in the sea of social media discourse. The advances of information technologies for sharing, discussing, and defining meaning have pushed the importance of the cognitive domain of the battlespace to heights never before seen in history. This transformation of the external environment has for the last two decades fed the perception of increasing warfighting complexity. Cold War military organizations and their outdated doctrines have constantly been challenged by the impact of new technologies internally, and externally. This rise of perceived complexity has led to numerous research fields associated with the transformation of the military, first dealing with the exploitation of network technologies, then moving to understanding the social and organizational impact of these technologies. It is from this parallel focus that one constant theme has emerged for dealing with the new environment – agility.
The second section presents the applied research concept of ‘agility’, and its key components. It will start with the broad conceptualization of “agility” as developed by NATO (including Denmark) and the US Department of Defense (US DoD) over the last decade. This will include some insight into the direction the final stage of development is taking in terms of offering a framework for operationalization in 2013, with regards to assessment and measurement.
The third section introduces and describes the RDDC contribution to agility studies, the sub-concept of ‘battlespace agility’, defined as the speed at which knowledge is turned into actions for the desired effects. It looks specifically at agility within the context of effective warfighting. The RDDC contribution is unique, in that it focuses specifically on agility within the battlespace where the military is conducting operations, and agility assessments are framed within the cyclical language of planning, execution, and assessment. It is within this context that battlespace agility clearly establishes the critical role of military intelligence in achieving agility. It argues that in order to orient the complexities of modern battlespace environments, the quality of military intelligence is of the up most importance to ensuring the warfighting organization operates as effective as possible in the battlespace. Battlespace characteristics such information timeliness and correctness, are essential to providing the Commander with a situational awareness and understanding of both the physical and cognitive domains of the battlespace, in which they are to take actions.
Section 1: Battlespace 4th Generation (4G)
After 10 years of research4 informed by social theory, experimentation, NATO doctrinal studies and lessons learned from field experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, Gulf of Aden, and Libya, a generic conceptualization of the modern battlespace has developed. Emerging from this discourse is a distinct understanding of war that accepts that modern militaries have to fight in a post-modernist5 battlespace, where all situational understandings for determining military actions are assumed to be socially constructed realities and constantly subjected to change. How effective one is at warfighting, is essentially the result of how effective one is at managing the intersubjective relationship between itself and its battlespace. Intersubjectivity refers to the interaction between knowledge6 and the material world, neither of which are fixed.7 This definition has its origins in international relations and security studies, including the Copenhagen School8 of critical security studies, dating back to the mid-90’s, and is well suited to working within the modern warfighting context.9 The implications in short, that understanding the roll of concepts like norms, culture, identities, as well as processes like, the projection of meanings, or , how support or attack narratives10, is intricately related to successfully understanding the how and when to destroy enemy capacities or occupy terrain.11
Understanding ‘warfighting’ as an intersubjective activity, simply means that the military recognizes the dynamic relationship between physical actions and their cognitive interpretations within the battlespace. In practical terms, it means that both domains, and the interaction between them, must constantly be assessed in order to execute the right actions, at the right time, at the right place in the battlespace to achieve the desired effects. While military actions do not take place in a socially cognitive void, and never have12, the universal adoption of revolutionary information technologies has exponentially increased the ability of the world to engage in discourse like never before. The role of rapidly developing information technologies cannot be understated in this regard, as it has singlehandedly brought the cognitive domain of the warfighting environment to the forefront - like no other time in history.13
This simplistic representation of modern warfare in Fig. 1.0 above does not escape the more theoretical ontological assumptions stemming from its conventional constructivist foundation14. Whether one chooses to discuss it or not however, is another factor. From an ontological perspective, warfighting is a simply the expression of an organization trying to manage intersubjectivity within a specific context, the battlespace. Therefore the entity that manages intersubjectivity best – wins!
And though military history is rich with soldier poets, scientists, and philosophers, there has been a tendency for military professionals of great intellectual calibre to resist engaging the “long haired” ontological discussions. A possible testament to the strength of the linear security found in military doctrines produced by industrial societies through 40yrs of Cold War routine emphasis on the balance sheets.15 The role of military intelligence during this period was using the comparative method of counting soldiers, battleships, bombers, or ICBMs in order to determine strategy.16 However, there is a trail of lessons learned since the end of the Cold War can be followed from Iraq I, to Somalia, the Balkans, Kosovo, Iraq II and Afghanistan.17 Physical boundaries are of course determined by the technical capabilities of assets brought to a battlespace and remain for physical actions; yet how meaning is attached to those actions no longer has any clearly defined physical boundaries. 18 Technology has pushed the cognitive domain of any warfighting environment to a position of primacy over the physical in terms of determining the “final” effects of physical actions. Consequently, there is no point in expecting decisive victories when formulating strategies based primarily on calculations in the physical domain – if the very opponent you are trying to defeat materially does not use the physical domain as the main terms of reference for their own strategic19 decision-making. For example, they might be designing their operations to promote a dominating “narrative.” The reality of warfighting today is that the net value of any particular action, in any given battlespace, at any given time, will be determined by the interaction between the physical and cognitive domains. Be warned, it is not a zero-sum calculation between the two domains and the net resulting effect no matter how desirable - is likely a perishable good.
The battlespaces in which we fight have become more complicated, fluid, and volatile in the information age; therefore our capacities to provide situational awareness and understanding must be improved in terms of quality and timeliness accordingly. The 20th century contests of quantity and strength of actions to determine success on ‘a hill top’ with a formal treaty of surrender is no longer valid; but rather the ‘many and small’ beat the ‘few and large,’ and ‘finding matters more than flanking’ notions are the requirement of the day.20 And this entails quality, speed, and precision of actions to maintain a set of desirable dynamic conditions, rather than achieving a static end-state. It will obviously not be easy to engage the new nature of war - if you are only geared for the old.
There is one strain of research that directly tries to deal with the management of intersubjectivity; it focuses squarely on the necessity for ‘agility’ and transitioning our militaries to be more situational responsive warfighting organizations.
Section 2: Agility
When agility is seen as a generic organisational ‘capability’, it represents a potential: measuring it requires an understanding of the characteristics, attributes, and behaviours that either enable or inhibit agility21. The idea of agility as a key Command & Control (C2) related concept / capability that requires research by the military community began almost a decade ago in discussions between U.S. and UK researchers and analysts22. These discussions grew to include colleagues from Australia, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Canada and others. The resulting generic definition from this joint research endeavour is presented below and is further specified in order to assist with its operationalization in terms of observations and measurements.23 AGILITY: Agility is the capability to successfully effect, cope with and/or exploit changes in circumstances.
This generic definition is further specified in the language of the coming NATO SAS085 report as follows: “Successfully is defined as operating within acceptable bounds. This includes defining the significance of “out of bounds performance” as a function of both magnitude (how far) and duration (how long).” This understanding acknowledges the role of relativity and subjectivity in determining the boundaries for assessing when agility is being enabled or inhibited. In terms of military operations this translates into the boundaries’ set by situation awareness, situational understanding, and the determination of desired effect(s), setting the parameters for the agility assessment.
“Change in Circumstances includes both changes to the State of the Environment (including other entities) and/or to the State of Self. These changes are not restricted to the physical domain, but also include changes to variables in the Information, Cognitive, and Social domains as well.” This is the ‘agility’ recognition of the intersubjective dynamic, where the both the physical and cognitive domains are represented externally in the surrounding environment and internally in the organization.
“Effect implies being proactive and therefore able to bring about a change in circumstances in order to improve performance, effectiveness or efficiency.” It suggests directly that intersubjectivity can be subjected to strategic thought and management, a necessary fundamental for operational planning.
“Cope with implies dealing with one or more of the above changes in circumstances that, if not appropriately addressed, would adversely affect performance (effectiveness and efficiency).”
“Exploit implies capitalizing on an opportunity to take advantage of changed circumstances, that if not seized would result in an opportunity loss (a failure to improve performance – improved effectiveness or efficiency or both).” This inherently invites the strategic thinking into the dynamics of agility and will be intimately linked to the setting of boundaries for agility measurements.
Components of Agility24
The following six components of agility were first introduced into the literature circa 2003 as aspects of agility. These components form the framework for establishing measurements of agility and provide guidance as to the merits of particular descriptors/indicators of what to assess within a given situation for an organisation. These components are not mutually exclusive of one another and in terms of operationalizing battlespace agility will use, as it point of departure, the same definitions adopted by SAS-06525.
- Timeliness/Responsiveness- For an organization to be agile, it must be able to respond to change of circumstances when required. Being responsive is simply a matter of being able to react in a timely manner. This is a function of the ability to accomplish the tasks required to take action and the time it takes for the action(s) to have an effect. This includes the time, relative to the change in question, a need for a response is recognized (in anticipation or in reaction to an event), when an appropriate response is determined, and when the actions necessary can be taken. But responsiveness alone does not guarantee that an entity26 will manifest agility, that is, be successful. To be successful, one not only to be responsive, but also the actions taken need to have the intended result. That is, enable the entity to keep performance within acceptable bounds, to return to an acceptable level of performance, or to improve effectiveness and/or efficiency so that resources expended can be reduced. Four of the components of agility -- flexibility, resilience, innovativeness and adaptability each and in combination address different kinds of stresses or provide various means to respond to changes in circumstances.
- Flexibility - provides more than one way of accomplishing something. Thus, if the current approach is rendered ineffectual or too expensive as a result of a change in circumstance, flexibility offers at least one alternative. Responsiveness, flexibility, innovation, and adaptability are all “active” and involve orchestrating a response.
- Versatility27 requires no response. It refers to the possession of a set of characteristics that makes it possible for that entity to successfully cope with a set of changes without taking action. That is, under certain circumstances, a change in entity behavior may not be necessary to exhibit agility. Thus, agility has components that are both passive and active. Passive agility involves characteristics that allow the entity to continue to operate effectively as is, despite changes in circumstances or conditions. An example of this passive quality is versatility.
- Innovativeness involves creating something new, i.e. a new ways of accomplishing something in the event that current practice does not provide adequate capability or performance. While flexibility refers to have more than one choice, innovativeness adds new ways and means to the toolkit.
- Adaptability refers to making changes to self in response to changes in the environment. In this case, it is not what one does that needs to change, but what one is and how one operates. Thus, adaptability could involve changes in organization and/or processes.
- Resilience can be either passive or active or both. Resilience pertains to changes that damage or degrade an entity. Being resilient involves an ability to maintain performance within acceptable bounds despite suffering damage. Being resilient may require that some action being taken (e.g. bring some offline capability on-line) or it may require no action be taken (e.g. existing redundancies provide the protection needed). For example, an appropriately designed network can still provide acceptable services in the event a number of links goes down.
There are numerous ways these components could interact, creating synergies that enhance an entity’s agility28. As mentioned above, innovativeness and flexibility have some obvious interactions. Innovativeness makes it possible to create new options to add to one’s toolkit; while flexibility enables entities to take full advantage of the available options (having options in the toolkit is not an end unto itself). Responsiveness interacts with a number of components. One way to be more responsive is to anticipate changes rather than wait for an event to be detected. If one is able to do this, then the time available to mount a response increases. Having more time available may mean that some options that were not feasible because they took too much time to implement or took too much time to create effects may become feasible, enhancing flexibility. More time may also provide an opportunity for being more innovative.
Operationalizing Agility in the generic understanding is about moving Agility from a desire to a capability, from a theory to a practice, and that requires that we are able to:
- Observe agility or a lack of agility
- Measure the degree to which that is manifested by an entity in a particular situation
- Estimate the degree of effectiveness that an entity will manifest in a particular situation
- Estimate an entity’s agility potential with respect to a set of possible circumstances
This situation is depicted in Fig 2.1 29 which involves an event that has had, after some delay, an adverse impact that results in an unsatisfactory level of performance, an outcome that indicates some lack of agility.
The event is detected at the time performance became unsatisfactory. After some period of time, a response is decided upon, and after some delay, action is taken. The measure of value is ultimately restored to a value that is within the acceptable range. However, because performance has not remained in the acceptable range, the entity has not displayed sufficient responsiveness.
The solid black line depicts actual performance levels over time. The dotted line depicts performance levels that would have occurred had the event not taken place (serves as a baseline). The difference (area) between these two lines is the consequence of the entity’s agility, or as in this case, a lack of agility. Translating this area into a measure of value is context dependent. In analysing the significance of this size / shape of this area, the part of the area within acceptable bounds should be treated differently than the part of the area that is outside of the acceptable bounds.
Readers can imagine how the area between these curves would change if the entity’s responsiveness could have improved. For example, the time between detection and action were reduced or if the event was anticipated and a response was initiated prior to the event actually occurring. Another way to improve the agility manifested here would be to reduce the time it takes for a response to have the desired effect. Fig. 2.2 depicts the consequences a reduction in response time (the time between the event and the restoration of performance to within acceptable bounds) would have on the area between the curves. In this case, the reduced response time (agility manifested) mitigates the adverse impact of the change so that the measure of success never goes outside of the acceptable range.
Section 3: Operationalizing Battlespace Agility
As part of a Danish contribution to NATO and US DOD studies in agility, the RDDC focused on exploiting its active participation in the Afghanistan conflict in battlespace Helmand to further test and assess several aspects of military agility specifically within the context of real battlespace doctrinally defined by a systems of systems understanding, PMESII30. This approach ensured a unique contribution to the general agility research, as Denmark was the only contributing country with a case study not simulated in a battle lab but was conducted in real-time operations in Afghanistan.
It is here, within the context of actual warfighting that key issues relating to battlespace agility were fleshed out, especially the action-effects dynamic that drives the relationship between the warfighting organization and its environment that resulted in the following definition of battlespace agility.
BATTLESPACE AGILITY: The speed at which knowledge is turned into actions for desired effects. 31 Though all the generic components of agility still apply, battlespace agility specifically looks at the engagement of the military organisation in the environment within the context of existing operational doctrines and principles. In this regard the definition reflects effect-based thinking as in its most general sense as driving the operational processes. The definition also represents the three main components of battlespace subject to quality discussions within the context of measurement.
- Knowledge: The battlespace situational awareness of the warfighting organisation, as well as situational understanding defined for operational planning purposes. It is determined within the given context of a battlespace and used to inform the commander’s decision-making.
- Speed: Refers to the time it takes for the warfighting organisation to turn situational awareness and understanding in to actions through operational planning. (Please note here that operational planning does not refer to any set timeline or process, it could be 3 months at NATO command corridors at SHAPE or 3 minutes in front of pick-up truck in the sand in theatre). Whether or not actions are timely is a function of situation specific desired effects.
- Actions: Both kinetic and non-kinetic activity executed by the warfighting organisation in the battlespace.
- Desired effect: The in tended change of the warfighting organization as regards the state of a battlespace system or ‘system of systems’ as defined by PMESI, resulting from one or more deliberate actions, including deliberate in-action.
These four components of battlespace agility have a well-established taxonomy of measurement variables available for assessment, the majority of which are presented in C2 variable definitions of NATO SAS 050 Report of 2006. Here is a sample of some of this variables that can be used to assess the above components of battlespace agility for a given warfighting organisation in a given situation.
Using Table 1.0 as an example, one can see how the actual operationalization of battlespace agility occurs. For example, if action accuracy is assessed to be low for an operation or a campaign, battlespace agility is reduced, if information relevance is assessed as high then battlespace agility is improved.
Important to retain here is the fact that agility is not just about being quick - but also about precision, or making the correct moves at the right time. One can certainly be fast and not agile or worse, clumsy. Therefore achieving the ‘desired effects’ will be the net result of both precision and speed. It is for this reason that the role of knowledge development and dissemination is primal in terms of battlespace agility. If the situational awareness in is off target, it is likely the actions will be less appropriate for the time and space and therefore less likely to produce the desired effects.
It is because of this that quality and timeliness of military intelligence/sense-making to support the commanders is the fundamental determining factor for achieving battlespace agility in any given situation.32
At the core of the operationalization of battlespace agility is the belief that there can be no agility in the battlespace if knowledge development33 and dissemination is not timely enough, or of a sufficient quality. The implication of this fact to goes to the heart of the why military intelligence, as the tool for providing situational awareness and understanding, must be seen unequivocally as the essential capability of the warfighting organisation. You could have the best weapons platforms available for operational use, but the when, where, and why to use them in a more cognitively complex world, places the onus of pursuing desired effects squarely on the human capacity to analyse and contextualise. Every situation is in a constant state of change - intersubjectivity is constant, what maybe a desired effect under one circumstance ay suddenly be no longer desired as something in that context has changed.
Without a knowledge development capacity striving to translate that change as fast as and as accurately as possible, the likelihood that the campaign, operation, or tactical engagement will produce the desired effects - is reduced.
This is not to suggest that the other aspects of warfare such as operations, logistics, and fires are not subject to the assessment components of agility in general. The primacy of military intelligence however, as a precondition for agile warfighting, cannot be denied. Nor more than the importance of the initial situational awareness & understanding in determining what follows operationally - cannot be understated. Especially if one intends to marry capability, economic efficiency, and desired effect, via situational awareness and understanding - in a fight. Where it concerns the amalgamation of intelligence, capacities, economics, and effect, operational experience from Afghanistan brings this point home. Research in the battlespace found that on a comparative calculation of desired effect, combining PMESII34 driven intelligence analysis with a small unit of soldiers owning a ‘sniffer’ dog produced more freedom of movement (FoM) and desired effect over 3 days, than traditional intelligence analysis and a squadron of heavy tanks over a month. Contrasting the economic calculations of this comparison will likely produce just as stark a result. It was our collective failure to correctly understand the context in which we were fighting – a failure of knowledge development - that led to campaign planning, that in hindsight, were expensive and relatively ineffective.
Denmark has recognized that being able to do the right thing at the right time and at the right place is essential to achieving desired effects in modern battlespace.35 In this regard, the Cold War habits for how military intelligence capacities are developed and managed are in the process of being revised. The military intelligence community in Denmark has also recognised that the times ahead will require better quality intelligence analysis capabilities to ensure battlespace agility in military operations in the 21st century.36 It is not simply a matter of more ISTAR37, on the contrary as illustrated by the US in Afghanistan, one can have all the high-tech ISTAR in play, and yet one poorly trained all-source analyst could undermine the totality of the investment in a few minutes. Amongst NATO allies, Denmark is quietly leading the way along with US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), NATO School (NSO), NATO Special Operations Headquarters (HSHQ), European Command (EUCOM), with a renaissance in the military intelligence research, education, and practice. There are on-going research streams with a direct focus on sensor exploitation, social network analysis, structured analytical techniques, and a variety of other off-shooting topics, including dual use sensors and analysts (ISTAR sensors and analysts that can be used in peace time for supporting disaster relief or analysts that can cross over to support police if circumstances call for it). However where the biggest progress has been is in improving the quality of military intelligence analysts via education and training. This includes establishing and synchronising various intelligence training programs to slowly build up a military intelligence community that is built solidly on the nexus of academic research and practice. This includes progressively building and strengthening a line of specialisation within the military while significantly contributing to the strengthening of intelligence analysis community in Denmark in general. It also includes promoting the establishment of ascending level based training programs starting at the very basics, but already here including network analysis with some supporting structured analytical techniques being taught at the tactical level. On this particular aspect, Denmark is emerging from transition as a driving force behind fundamental changes inside the military intelligence community across NATO.38 This in turn bodes well for the Danish armed forces ability to effectively deal with future conflicts through an organizational confidence and belief in its own ability to operationalize battlespace agility – come what may.
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NATO SAS-085 (Forthcoming 2013) Operationalizing Agility
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1 Developed form the critical security studies context of the ‘Copenhagen School’ led by Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan, the first applications for operations were proposed by the Danish research delegation at the 2003 British International Studies Association (BISA). The research was supported by the University of Aarhus and the Royal Danish Defense College (RDDC), and was presented at the conference via the Security and Intelligence Panel under the heading “Normative Strategic Analysis” illustrating the uses for conventional constructivism in operational sciences was presented. The first formal application of conventional constructivism applied in combat was through 2007- ISAF CJ2, for targeting and ISTAR delegation. Also see RDDC research presented in Washington 14th International Command & Control Research & Technology Symposium (ICCRTS) and 16th ICCRTS, as well as RDDC research Mitchell 2004, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2012 a,b,c.
2 See RDDC contribution to the 14th ICCRTS “Sense-making in an Intersubjective Environment” that was nominated for best paper over 150 papers.
3 See Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay introduction to the new Canadian Joint Operational Command (CJOC) May 11, 2012. National Defence and the Canadian Forces Nr 12.078.; Or the US Secretrary of Defence Leon Panetta “more agile, more flexible, ready to deploy quickly, innovative, and technologically advanced. Agility is the doctrinal centerpiece of the new SOFCOMs see Day & Horn (2010). That is the force of the furture.” Speech. The Envoy. Jan 5, 2012, Washington D.C.; However, outside of applied research circles, it has been in pipeline for over a decade Robinson Jr. (2003) Macnaughter (2000) Mann (2001).
4 See the Command & Control (C2) epistemology engaging power to the edge (Alberts & Hayes, 2005) research with a specific focus on agility. Alberts and Hayes, 2005, 27; Alberts & Hayes, 2005, 218; SAS-026 NATO 2002; SAS-050 CCRP/NATO 2006;Also see Alberts 2011, 1997; Snyder 1993; Coakly 1991; Crumley 1989;
5 Postmodernism postulates that many, if not all, apparent realities are only social constructs and are therefore subject to change. It claims that there is no absolute truth and that the way people perceive the world is subjective and emphasizes the role of language, power relations, and motivations in the formation of ideas and beliefs. (See An Overview of Premodernism, Modernism, & Postmodernism. Postmodern Psychology. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Feb 2012. (http://www.postmodernpsychology.com/); For an example in military sociology see Henrotin (2004).
6 Knowledge here is understood from the conventional constructivist perspective that accepts a subjective context for the pragmatic extraction of knowledge gained from the deconstruction of an intersubjective relationship. In short, radical constructivists (Frankfurter school) do not accept that knowledge exists as intersubjectivity cannot be stopped. See Ted Hoff (1998) & Mitchell (2004).
7 See Adler 1997, 322; Adler 2002, 104-109. Checkel 1998, 324-348; Reus-Smit 2001, 218. See conventional constructivism in Ted Hopf’s “Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory” presented in International Security in 1998; and Adler 1998.
8 Essentially the Copenhagen School argues for intersubjective understanding of security and the ‘securitization’ of non-military issues such as the environment. It is an approach the points to the management of intersubjective knowledge to determine subjective security positions. (Using intersubjectivity strategically). See Mutimer 2007 p. 60. See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde 1997. Earlier related 1990’s epistemologies including constructivist thinking in security policy analysis: Katzenstein 1996; Hopf 1998; Barnet 1996, 1998, 1999; Finnemore 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001; Kratochvil 1996, 1989; Klotz 1995; and Wendt 1992, 1995, 1999.
9 Mitchell 2004, 190-194; Applied examples - Mitchell 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c.
10 See Nissen article in this issue - as well as 2011, 2012.
11 The physical vs. cognitive division of battlespace has ontological roots in the bridge between rational choice theories and constructivist theories as described in Adler 1997, 318-363; Hopf, 1998; Checkel 1999, 2001. Mitchell 2004, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2012a,2012b,2012c.
12 Mitchell (2010): 1‐6.
13 See Netwars 2008: Ch.1; Smith 2006, 2005; Goodman 2003; Potts 2003; Moffat 2003;Alberts 2002;Treverton 2001;Rogers 1996 for different takes on the impact of information technology on both the internal and external environments.
14 Mitchell 2004:Ch.3.
15 For example see Halloway 1983.
16 Tom Czerwinski 1998:7-26
17 For operational C2 focused examples see Mitchell (2011a) Afghanistan; Boré 2009:65-71 ( Africa); Allard, Kenneth 2005: 19-67 (Somalia).
18 Look to Barnett’s narrative explanation of Egypt’s decision to go to war with Israel Barnett, 1998 for one of first uses; Nissen 2012a, 2012b, 2011; NATO AJP 2.0 Draft 2011; Mitchell 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2010a, 2010b, 2004.NATO (2007).
19 Edward N. Luttwak (2001):3-50. Luttwak explains the logic of strategic thinking within a the context of war, the paradoxical logic affecting the combatants was linear in terms of material/efficiency calculations, both sides referred to the same physical domain. However the same logic applies to the onset of asymmetric warfare, the physically weaker side can circumvent the overwhelming physical advantage by changing the terms of strategic reference to the cognitive domain – this choice is also a product of the logic of strategy and human innovation.
20 Arquilla (2010)
21 See Alberts 2011; NATO SAS 08.
22 See the acknowledgement section of Alberts, D. S. and Hayes, R.E., Power to the Edge, DoD CCRP Publications Series, Washington, D.C. 2003
23 Organizational agility is the capacity to react more effectively in a rapidly changing operating environment. (Understanding Information Age Warfare, Alberts 2001, p197); Agility: adjusting to changes in the operational situation in a timely manner. (Understanding Information Age Warfare, Alberts 2001, p217); Agility is a key characteristic of an Information Age organization; a characteristic to be sought even at the sacrifice of seeking to perfect capabilities associated with specific missions or tasks. (Information Age Transformation, Alberts 2002, p82; Agile can be used to describe each component of an organization’s mission capability packages (MCPs), and/or an organization that can instantiate many MCPs. (Power to the Edge, Alberts, 2003, p123); Agility: an ability of the forces to adapt, to learn and to change to meet the threats that they face. (The Agile Organization, Alberts 2005, p164); Agility presumes effective actions and implies a degree of self-synchronization. (Understanding Command and Control, 2006, p201)
24 See Alberts 2011, Ch.14, for a more detailed discussion.
25 SAS-065 produced Version 2.0 of the NATO C2 Conceptual Reference Model. This version of the model provides definitions for these Enablers of Agility.
26 SAS-085 uses the word ‘entity’ to include individuals, teams, organizations, and collectives as well as approaches, processes and systems. The entity is the focus of the analysis.
27 Originally called Robustness, SAS-085 relabeled this component to avoid confusion with usage in other disciplines.
28 See Alberts 2011, pp.219-221.
29 Adapted from Figure IV-6, Alberts 2011.
30 PMESII - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, the dominant system of systems analysis (SOSA) framework used at all levels of NATO planning.
31 Mitchell 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2010a; Origins are both doctrinal and theoretical, for example NATO SAS 050, COPD, and Smith 2005, 2006. It falls best within effects based thinking and not the earlier versions of EBO or EBAO.
32See doctrinal development line stretching 20 years, NATO AJP 2.0 2012; Mitchell 2012b, 2010b; Phister 2004; NATO SAB-TR-02-01 2002; Owens 1995; and Schoffner 1993
33 See Libicki 1996 for the starting point to focus on knowledge development with doctrinal implications.
34 PMESII – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure domains of a battlespace and represents a system of systems approach. It can also be portrayed accurately as interacting social networks. NATO Bi-Strategic Command Pre-Doctrinal Handbook, 2007, 5-3.
35 Phsiter (2004):2. Known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), its purpose is to keep the commander aware of recent, current, and near term events in the battlespace. See Mitchell 2002, 480-485; Heuer 2006, 47-105. See Smith 2006, 149-193.
36 See Schoffner 1993, 31-35.
37 ISTAR-Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Aquisition, & Reconaissance
38 Since 2008, the RDDC has supported NATO School and ISAF with basic and advanced intelligence analysis training, as well as expeditionary and COIN intelligence training. This includes research inputs as well as instruction. Also the RDDC has contributed to the development of NATO intelligence doctrine on various issues, from targeting to site exploitation. The RDDC has also contributed intelligence inputs into US doctrine development through bi-lateral agreements.
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