Yuri Morozov - Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences
Yuri Dubov - Associate Member of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems
Alexander Lebedev - Professor of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems
Actions speak louder than words
Tomorrow's Europe and the prospects o f its development in the X X Is t century, in many respects, w ill depend on future relations between Russia and N A T O , on whether Moscow and Brussels w ill be able to neutralise political damage to their relations, caused by the known events in Yugoslavia. The usage o f the military power o f the Alliance for the solution o f problems o f the Yugoslavian crisis and to a significant extent disregard o f the opinion o f Russia have been reflected not only in the relations between the parties, but also put Europe in the direction o f a new Cold War. Application o f force has led to the re-evaluation o f priorities in creation o f the new architecture o f European security. Euphoria concerning the termination o f ideological confrontation, which used to divide Europe into two camps, and hope for the forming o f a Multivector W orld have been substituted by anxiety and uncertainty concerning prospects o f the forthcoming world order. The increasing potential differences between Russia and the West at the turn o f the century has brought their relations to a critical line. The objective neces- sity o f resolving this situation by means o f different compromises and countering in search o f a mutual understanding at defining ways to stabilise the situation has become obvious. This should be realised within the framework o f the Russia - West relations' strategy, where N A T O plays one o f the leading roles. Apparently, Europe o f the XX Ist century is not so much a geographic concept, but rather a concept that is engaged in the standards o f behaviour o f the states and intergov- ernmental formations on the international arena. There is no doubt that, at present and in future too, the political climate in the Euro-Atlantic region, to a great extent, w ill be determined by the state o f relations between Russia and N A T O . The success o f settling many o f the vital problems, not only concerning the security, but also others, such as the economics and ecology spheres - the spheres that are basic to the existence o f mankind - w ill depend on whether these relations are based on cooperation and partnership or on suspicion and confrontation. The events o f recent years show that the peoples o f Europe do not want a return to the times o f ideological confrontation and Cold War. The cooperation between Russia and N A T O outlined at the end o f the XX th century gives a hope that what might remain o f the Cold W ar ice won't freeze the w ill o f Moscow and Brussels for military and political cooperation, for forming on its basis a model o f an all-European security system. The cooperation experienced between Russia and the Alliance, especially during the elimination o f conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and M e tohija is impressive, but their relations have not reached a state o f irreversible character yet. A number o f facts show that certain political forces wanting to restore a Europe o f the Past still exist in the world. And this is rather dangerous, because Russia and N A T O have a very limited cooperation experience. The more so, because the transition period from confrontation to cooperation o f the 90s has not been confirmed by a firm political base and, naturally, can be accompanied by psychological and military-technical difficulties. The basis for mutual distrustfulness that can harm common interests still exists.
Along with the progress achieved in Russia-NATO relations, the increased NATO activity in regions that arc o f strategic significance to Russia can't help causing a concern o f the Russian public, especially against the background o f the latest rough political events. The plans o f Washington tc deploy the US national antimissile system, estimated to be aggravating strategic stability and security not only o f Russia, but also o f other European states, are strongly opposed by the Russian leadership. It would be desirable to hope that the political management of both sides clearly perceives and realises that the problems which they might encounter in the XX Is t century - and these are, first of all, threats o f a local character such as aggressive nationalism, terrorism, uncontrolled spread o f weapons o f mass de- struction, unsettled regional disputes and the like - can be settled only by joint efforts in close mutual cooperation. When evaluating the prospects for Russia-NATO relations, one should closely and scrupulously trace the development of the forming o f the bilateral relations, aimed at providing peace and stability in the region.
The Basic Act - fundamentals of development of NATO-RUSSIA relations
The main method for building the European security system w ill be a develop- ment o f the partnership sphere between corresponding European and Euro- Atlantic institutions and separate states. The formation o f a system o f partner relations in today's Europe is a problem requiring the building o f a definite prior- ity system, because the traditional security problem - the inadmissibility o f a large-scale war in Europe - has been practically resolved and w ill hardly arise again in the foreseeable future. Today it is necessary to understand that main point in the relationships, which w ill determine our joint future and the future o f all Europe.
Therefore, the adoption o f the Basic Ru ssia-NATO Act, fixing the general understanding o f the present situation and laying down the mutual obligations o f both sides, has been an important step in the history o f Moscow-Brussels rela- tions. This document, signed on M ay 27. 1997 in Paris, has opened up a new stage in the development o f Ru ssia-NATO cooperation and has designated a vast field for strategic partnership; also it has determined spheres, norms and mecha- nisms o f their future relations. As far as it is possible, the Basic Act has reduced negative consequences o f the Alliance expanding to the East and has created a base for the building o f new relations between Russia and the West. However, its signing was only the begin- ning o f a long and difficult process o f establishing equal partner relations. Only practical implementation o f the agreement signed by the parties will, in many respects, determine the fundamental base for the long-term mutual relations as well as stages o f the building o f a new European security system architecture. It is thought that at the moment o f the signing o f the Act, both parties lacked the perspective vision o f development o f relations. So, the Basic A ct can be considered a compromise document requiring a long "running - in” period. Along with this, the document gives a real chance for a positive political dialogue in the course o f settlement o f vital problems o f the modern World. During the A ct preparation process and estimation o f prospects for the develop- ment o f the military-strategic situation in the W orld and Europe, the leadership o f Russia has agreed that N A T O is a reality, which w ill exist for an indefinitely long time and w ill seriously influence the situation in Europe. Russia, and N A TO , too, have realised that a European security system without Russia makes no sense. In this situation, both parties experienced a problem: What w ill Russia desire from N A T O (and vice versa) now and in future, and to what extent are these expectations realistic? More likely, the main concern o f Russia and N A T O is the final demilitarisation o f their relations. The way to achieve this goal is long and difficult, but it must be covered together, jointly solving arising problems. The main directions o f this way arc laid down in the Basic A ct and can be divided into three groups.
The first group comprises measures providing mutual trust and security on the basis o f strategic balance, taking into account new European political and military realities and providing equal security for all states disregarding their membership o f any political-military alliance. It also includes arms control prob- lems and all aspects o f problems pertaining to nuclear security.
The second group of measures can be reckoned among measures aimed at organisation o f multilevel consultations and interaction between Russia and N A T O on European security and stability problems.
Into the third group one can include measures, realisation o f which must bring to appearance joint economic corporate interests capable o f serving as the strong material foundation o f security on the European continent. History has proven that the presence o f common economic interests always helps to reach consent about other key problems in the relations between partners.
More than three years, comprising both success and failures in the imple- mentation o f this document, have passed since the Basic A ct entered into force. They were full o f difficult and tedious work aiming at implementation o f the cooperation potential laid down in this most important political document. Those were the years, when Russia-West relations went through difficult tests. O f course, this period is rather short for modern politics, but it makes it possible to draw some conclusions and extract lessons o f the forming o f rela- tions, based on mutual understanding and cooperation. The main goal o f cooperation between Russia and N A T O proclaimed in the Basic A ct is the creation in Europe “o f common space o f security and stability without dividing lines or spheres o f interests limiting the sovereignty o f any state” . This goal, ir. the mutual agreement o f Russia and N A T O countries, was supposed to be reached as the result o f settlement o f a wide scope o f tasks per- taining to different spheres. The principal ones o f them are: conflict settlement (prevention); conduct o f joint peacekeeping operations; exchange o f information and consultations in the field o f strategy, defence policy, Russia and N A T O military doctrines; armament and nuclear security control; air and anti-missile defence cooperation; reconversion o f the defence industry; realisation o f joint initiatives and training in the field o f emergency situations and elimination o f disaster consequences and so on. Serious analyses o f military concepts and doctrines o f the parties must press forward the realisation o f these tasks, and based on this, it seems possible to define the fields o f future cooperation necessary for Russia and N A T O to acti- vate mutual relations and start the existing cooperation mechanisms. The preliminary analysis o f Russia and N A T O doctrinal clauses relating to military security shows that their contents correspond to the aims and tasks o f cooperation and meet the national interests o f both Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member states, though these interests do not always and in all respects coincide.
The aims o f Moscow in the field o f development o f cooperation with N A T O can be formulated as follows:
• to change approaches to the forming o f a collective security system, giving the priority to political means and simultaneously reducing the role o f m ili- tary power;
• to prevent forces, sticking in the Cold W ar period nostalgia, from restoring the former times in Europe;
• to provide on equal terms with N A T O security for all European states/ In the “N A T O bulletin” (1998), Klaus Peter Cliber - the N A T O Secretary General Assistant in Politics defined Russia-West interrelations in the fo l- lowing manner: "... we are still trying to bring to consideration to our Rus- sian friends the following: extension o f N A TO does not jeopardise national security interests o f Russia. On the contrary, by means o f integration o f countries o f the Central and Eastern Europe which is based on cooperation, we are strengthening security and stability in Europe, including Russia...” Trying to foresee the future, he noted, that "... Russia is going to fa ce a very promising future i f it will become a prosperous and open country: a partner sharing our interests in the field o f trade and stability: a partner helping in settlement o f potential regional conflicts; a neighbour conducting a confi- dent, transparent and peaceful policy: a partner to be trusted during arms control negotiations and a country cooperating with other states o f the Euro-Atlantic region in the fie ld o f threats repulsing and settlement o f the future problem s”.
Thus, as it seems, the aims o f the West regarding Russia comprise:
• its involvement into the network o f partner relations;
• eliminating the concern o f M oscow regarding the potential military threat from the West;
• sharing the burden o f responsibility for stabilisation o f situations in conflict regions o f Europe;
• prevention o f dangerous (from the Western point o f view) military activity.
But, one must not overestimate the opportunities and prospects o f coopera- tion, which have been opened by the signing o f the Basic Act. These limits were laid down in the very essence o f the signed document. First o f all, one must real- ise that the Basic A ct is not a juridical but a political document. This is not the treaty, on which Russia insisted, but a political obligation o f the parties, nothing more. As already mentioned, the essence o f the document presupposes compro- mises. It is a system o f mutual concessions. Political obligations o f the parties stated in the document often have general formulations creating the possibility o f their different interpretation by the parties (what has already happened). Thus, the Basic A ct may serve as the basis for Ru ssia-NATO cooperation as long as it is politically (from the strategic point o f view) beneficial for both parties and as long as they preserve friendly relations. In case the relations w ill change to being not so friendly and politically unprofitable for one party or the other, it w ill turn out to be a declaration o f no meaning. It should be noted that this has been the destiny o f all political documents (obligations), based on mutual compromises, which were not secured from the juridical point o f view. However, it cannot be called a shortcoming, as it is a reality which Russia and N A T O w ill have to deal with. That is why only the understanding o f this reality and a responsible policy aimed at the realisation o f the clauses o f this document give grounds for Russia and N A T O relations to acquire a positive character. Present Russia-NATO relations include fields o f cooperation, which were hard even to imagine during the Cold W ar period. So, joint Ru ssia-N A TO actions in the settlement o f the Bosnia and Kosovo confliets can be counted as unprecedented during the nearly half a century long history o f confrontation. For the first time, peacekeeping units and sub-units o f Russia and N A T O countries performed the given tasks in cooperation and under a single command. This confirms the presence o f mutual Ru ssia-NATO interests in the field o f providing peace and security in Europe and the presence o f a potential for realisation o f these goals. The cooperation precedent created to establish peace and to stop military confrontation gives solid grounds for future serious expectations, for hopes that the full scale and multisided cooperation w ill be established.
The Joint Russia-NATO Permanent Council - the mechanism of real cooperation
Analysing conditions and estimating further prospects for Ru ssia-NATO interre- lations, it seems necessary to evaluate the whole spectrum o f their interaction. From the point o f view o f the forming o f future collective security systems in Europe in the XX Ist century, the political and military cooperation spheres must be considered to be the most important ones at the present stage o f relations between Moscow and Brussels. In the political sphere, the forming o f the collective security insurance mechanism in Europe seems to be the main concern. Information exchange on military policy problems o f the countries o f the European region, political con- sultations on matters o f common interest, cooperation in the whole spectrum o f security, including peacekeeping matters, are the prerequisites for creation o f such a mechanism. The decisive role in extension o f trust measures and establishment o f close contacts, including in the military sphere, w ill belong to the Joint Permanent Council (JPC). The Russian leadership connected and is connecting its wishes and hopes for a raoid reach o f mutually acceptable positions, for the forming o f new regimes o f agreements aimed at preserving security o f all countries o f the European region, with its constructive and fruitful work. The starting c f a mechanism o f joint consultations on military matters is considered to be an important cooperation stage. In accordance with the schedule o f high-level meetings envisaged by the Ru ssia-NATO Basic Act, meetings o f Defence Ministers and Chiefs o f General (Joint) Staffs were conducted under the JPC auspices. The important matters pertaining to the defensive policies and military doctrines, to expanding transparency and cooperation in the military field, including the concept o f use o f peacekeeping forces, were discussed in detail during the sessions. The scope o f matters to be discussed is rather wide, but the Russian party rightfully considers that matters o f a more fundamental character for both par- ties, such as those connected with nuclear security and non-proliferation o f nu- clear weapons, the adoption o f the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Lim i- tation Treaty, directions on a reform o f the Russian Armed Forces and the N A T O military structure, limitation o f the military infrastructure o f the parties and so on, must be discussed at high level meetings, and decisions regarding them must be taken. It seems necessary during the working process o f the JPC to find common answers to the following important questions that are related to regional security: What is the role o f military force within the system o f modern international rela- tions in Europe and in its periphery? What are the conditions, principles and limits o f its use? What is the role o f nuclear weapons after the ending o f the Cold W ar and what are the prospects for transformation o f this role? What is the sense o f the classic balance o f conventional weapons during the working process o f the JPC under the conditions o f the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Lim ita- tion Treaty? How can the joint efforts prevent the emerging o f crisis within the regional security system? It appears that effectiveness o f the joint work within the JPC framework is possible only in case o f realisation o f four components:
The First - a balanced evaluation not only o f conceptual basics on the na- tional (collective) security o f Russia and the Alliance, but also o f doctrinal guidelines at the lower level. The main purpose o f this job is to point out similar basics and differences pertaining to the regional security - What is similar and what is different in approaches needed to provide this security? - What is similar and what is different in the defining o f directions for elim i- nation o f the discord.
The Second - joint assessment o f dangers and threats to regional stability and security. Obviously, this is the key to further effective work o f the par- ties. Elaboration o f a coordinated methodology is a possible way for the joint defining o f dangers and threats. It w ill make it possible to give a multilateral estimation o f events through criteria and indexes o f dangers and threats. It is natural that a common definition glossary w ill be needed to define terms like “a threat” , “a danger” and so on. This glossary w ill provide a common lan- guage for the military and political leadership.
The Third - joint elaboration o f a complex o f measures for an adequate re- action to an arising situation, including measures o f military and non- military character.
The Fourth - joint realisation o f measures aimed at stabilisation o f the situa- tion in the conflict and crisis regions o f Europe.
Other matters o f common interest to the R u ssia-NA TO military cooperation could be discussed in meetings o f military representatives held under the JPC auspices and with participation o f military experts. Such a consultative mechanism is o f great importance, principally to both Russia and N A T O because it w ill help to remove potential concerns and to solve disputable problems in the military sphere, to expand trust and promote the form- ing o f the future European Security System.
Fruitful and responsible work o f Russian representatives in the Russia- N A T O Council w ill make it possible to influence the fashion o f relations be- tween Moscow and the Alliance, which determines the state o f security on the European continent. Neither party should permit that the tones o f the past again cause conflict. O rly in the process o f practical realisation o f European security problems one can approach something that resembles a collective, all-embracing security system for the whole continent. In general, this political mechanism creates a favourable base for an expan- sion o f cooperation and mutually acceptable solutions to problems existing be- tween Russia and N A TO . In the military sphere - the cooperation, as a result, must allow for the keeping by the parties o f “ such military potentials which correspond to the legal individual or collective security needs with regard to their (parties) international obligations” .
The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Limitation Treaty - practical contribution of the parties to stabilisation o f the situation
The start and the steady running o f a mechanism o f maintenance o f European security is impossible without installation and fastening o f the legal fundamen- tals regulating, first o f all, armament levels in the region and the legal control o f their observance. Adaptation o f the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Lim i- tation Treaty plays the most important role here, because it w ill make it possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on basic elements o f a Future Treaty, to adjust armament and military materiel levels to the real military-political situation, to ensure balance o f forces and security in the European region. Adap- tation or, in plain words, JPC modernisation is the central problem, settlement o f which must determine further Ru ssia-NATO interaction in the military field and establishment o f European security in the XX Ist century. The aspiration o f each party for reviewing matters pertaining to the level reduction o f conventional armaments and, eventually, for reaching a consensus must be considered part o f their efforts aimed at a reduction o f the general level o f military confrontation. For a long time, Russia and N A T O were unable to reach the common vision o f adaptation o f the Treaty, but both parties were proceeding from the point that it must promote equal security o f all states and prevention o f any destabilising growth o f forces in various sub-regions o f Europe. That is why it was very d if fi- cult to reach the consensus. A fter a long joint working process, Russian and Western experts managed to find a compromise variant o f the solution to the problem. It was reflected in the Agreement on Adaptation o f the Conventional Armaments in Europe Limitation Treaty, signed in Istanbul during the summit o f state leaders and O S C E govern- ments on 18-19 November 1999.
It is obvious that the Agreement, in many respects and for years to come, w ill determine the character o f the armed forces' development in a number o f European states, including Russia. It is very important for Russia that in the conditions o f N A TO 's extension, the general reduced amount o f armament was reached through an armaments level reduction o f “old” N A T O members and the Central European Four - Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The group basis o f the Treaty (membership in a military alliance) has been trans- formed into a system o f national and territorial limiting levels. Now , the regime o f the Treaty is oriented towards a strengthening o f the security o f each member state regardless o f membership o f military-political blocks. One must mention that the Russian position has been more markedly re- flected in the adapted Treaty. So, the clauses regulating the flank situation com prise Russian demands for an increase o f the number o f armament in the Russian flank zone. Russia's quota o f armoured combat vehicles in regular units has been increased four times (from 580 to 2140 vehicles) The limit levels o f tanks in the flanking zone make 1,300 vehicles (former level - 700) and artillery -1680 (1280). Thus, the achievements o f the Russian party are rather significant, espe- cially i f it is taken into consideration that under the new scheme armament and combat vehicles may be positioned in regular units (according to the former clause o f the Treaty, the major part, in some cases more than the half, was to be warehoused). The diversified factors o f the changed geopolitical situation, including “ the flank problem” , have stipulated a strengthening o f the negotiation process be- tween the Russian Federation (RF) and “ the N A T O Southern member” - Turkey. According to the results o f the agreements reached, Turkey has agreed that the Russian flank limit should be increased in exchange for a reduction o f Russian military presence in Georgia and Moldova. M oscow has undertaken an obliga- tion to reduce its heavy armament on the Georgian territory up to the levels en- visaged by the Adapted Treaty by the end o f 2000 and close up two o f four exist- ing bases. As for Moldova, Russia has undertaken to withdraw its troops from the republic by the end o f 2001. The new Agreement clause about application o f a complex o f restricting, inspection and information measures on all movements o f armament and combat vehicles within the Treaty zone serves to strengthen it. Any troop movement, (if it consists o f more than 30 tanks, 30 combat vehicles or 10 artillery systems) across national boundaries are subject to notification. In case o f extraordinary temporary deployments, the convocation o f special conferences with subsequent reporting to the O SC E is envisaged. Control measures over observance o f the agreement have been augmented. Information exchange procedures are stipulated for once every three months (according to the former provision it was once a year), inspection quotas have been increased, a special transparency regime for cases o f increase o f territorial limit levels o f armament and combat vehicles has been envisaged. Despite the real available numerical advantage o f N A T O ’ s united armed forces over the armed forces o f the Russian Federation (3:1 disregarding combat efficiency) in all categories o f weapons, the new Agreement actually brings to nothing the practical capabilities for implementation o f this advantage. It does not permit to make large “overflows” o f armament and combat vehicles o f large units and units within the zone o f application. Exclusion o f the possibility o f having a destabilising concentration o f conventional armed forces is the major achieve- ment o f the Adopted Treaty. A t the same time, Russia and N A T O face further serious joint work in this area. A number o f problems o f European security, which were not included in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, have not been settled yet. It is necessary to work out a mechanism o f geographic limitations for the A ir Force. The Adapted Treaty envisages limitations on aircraft and helicopters only within national limit levels and a N A T O obligation not to base aircraft outside the 16 countries o f the Alliance. New and prospective N A T O members are still beyond the framework o f limitation o f armed forces, but the new strategic concept o f the Alliance envisages usage o f military force outside the responsibility zone. However, fundamentals for the solving o f these problems have been laid down. Unlike the 1990 pattern Treaty, which was o f a closed character (only Warsaw Treaty and N A T O members participated in it), the Adapted Treaty is open for any O S C E country. It gives a definite prospect for the future joint work in this direction. The existing problems demonstrate that there is still a long way to cover between Moscow and Brussels before they achieve complete interaction and confidence. However, such compromise steps are steps forward on the way o f construction o f new relations between Russia and N A T O , based on the mutual interests o f the parties. It would be desirable to stress once again that the value o f the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Limitation Treaty, as one o f the cornerstones o f interna- tional and European security, is indisputable. Merely the reduction o f armaments in the Treaty finished in 1995 has resulted in discarding 58,000 units o f arma- ment and combat vehicles meaning almost a halving o f the arms potential on the continent. Almost 2,500 inspections were conducted in accordance with the Treaty clauses about envisaged verification (control) o f measures taken by the parties to meet their obligations.
The Open Sky Agreement - a step forward towards creation of confidence
The idea o f “The Open Sky” originates from the plan o f the US President D. Eisenhower presented at the 1955 Geneva Conference, which envisaged the exchange o f comprehensive military information between the USSR and the U S A with check o f this information by means o f restricted aerial photography o f the terrain o f both countries. The US President George Bush presented a renewed plan in M ay 1989. The negotiations on this plan between The Warsaw Treaty Organisation and N A T O began in Ottawa in 1990 and were later continued in Vienna. As a result o f these talks, the Agreement on "The Open Sky” was elabo- rated by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and N A T O countries and signed on March 24, 1992. According to the Agreement the states have permitted surveillance over their territories through (lights o f unarmed aircraft at a short time inspection notice. A ll the signing states have access to the information obtained through such in- spections. The inspection region extends from Vancouver up to Vladivostok. However, up to now the Agreement has not come into force, because it was not ratified by Parliaments o f a number o f the CIS countries, including Russia. Nevertheless, without waiting for the legal coming into force o f the Agreement, Russia and a number o f the N A T O countries (Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Norway) carry out rather intensive air inspection programmes on a mutual basis, and also perform joint tentative inspection flights. Apparently, the ratification o f the Agreement opens up a possibility o f im- plementation o f one o f the most powerful measures o f confidence between Rus- sia and N A TO . In this field, Russia should make a decisive step in the sphere o f legal fastening o f provisions o f the Agreement, thus demonstrating an example o f good w ill to other CIS countries in the strengthening o f confidence measures.
“ The Partnership fo r Peace Programme” and directions fo r im- plementation o f its capabilities
Joint R F -N A T O manoeuvres and combat troops (forces) training within the scope o f the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) are also a matter o f mutual interest to the parties. The common interest in such joint manoeuvres is condi- tioned by the fact that during their execution, crisis settlement, tasks and also new non-traditional tasks such as relief o f different kinds o f disasters and natural calamity consequences are being performed. The Russian military leadership positively appreciates military cooperation with N A T O such as the participation o f Russian military contingents and observ- ers in the training o f peacekeeping forces because it gives an opportunity to gain cooperation experience in the course o f fulfilment o f peacekeeping tasks, it makes it possible to point out shortcomings, and outline ways o f their elimina- tion. So, the experience o f such interaction during the Bosnia and Herzegovina multinational peacekeeping operation showed that for further improvement and progress o f Russia-NATO military relations in the field o f peacekeeping it is necessary to co-operate not only on the tactical level but it is time to start opera- tional cooperation especially in the field o f planning and control. Therefore, a single mutually elaborated military-theoretical base for the peacekeeping activi- ties is a must. A t the same time, when estimating Ru ssia-NATO cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Bosnian experience can serve only as a starting point, but no more than that. When the talk is about Ko s- ovo and Metohija as another example o f cooperation between Russia and N A T O in the field o f peacekeeping, one must not forget that the whole operation was planned in Brussels and Washington. Russia did not take any part in it. There- fore, if the talk is about equivalent cooperation, the relations being created should imply for Russia the status o f an equivalent participant in such planning. Up to now, Russian military leaders and experts, to put it mildly, are limited in the participation in this process. A number o f measures connected with joint military security scientific re- search are envisaged by the P fP programme. This is a very important direction as it gives a prospect for Ru ssia-NATO relations, determines ways o f improvement and further perfection o f cooperation at the solution o f the different problems o f safeguarding peace and security on the continent. Already some positive experi- ence o f such activity has been accumulated. The first Russian-American research on generalisation o f the experience gained o f preparation and application o f multinational forces based on the exam- ple o f operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been completed. It would be desirable to hope that the results o f the Russian-American research w ill promote activation o f international efforts in the interest o f creation o f a universal collec- tive security system for mankind in the XX Ist century. Several new scientific joint projects are planned for the next years to come: Russian-American research project on peacekeeping in Kosovo and Metohija, Russian-Italian joint research project on problems o f preventive diplomacy, and others. One can hope that these research programmes w ill create a stable foundation o f the future coopera- tion between Russian and Western military scientists. The effective cooperation o f European states within the framework o f the P fP programme w ill allow a more thorough usage o f the available peacekeeping and security potential. Russia cannot ignore these positive processes. A t the same time, a number o f circumstances bound, first o f all, with a peculiar orientation o f the majority o f measures envisaged by the P fP programme indicate a tendency o f the N A T O leadership to attract new European states into the orbit o f the A lli- ance. That is why Russian political and military leaders cannot help expressing concern over the attempts o f usage o f the P fP programme to enlarge the Alliance.
Prospects of further activities aimed at stabilisation of the situation in conflict regions of Europe
Perhaps, joint activities within the multinational peacekeeping forces are the most vivid example o f cooperation, which can prove effectiveness o f Russia- N A T O cooperation. Lessons learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Metohija peacekeeping operations demonstrate that i f there is a political w ill o f the N A T O member countries and countries non-participant to the Block, their armed forces can settle a regional conflict by joint efforts. It fully applies to the Russian peacekeeping contingent. The effective actions o f Russian units within the multinational forces have proven that Russia is capable o f conducting joint peacekeeping operations within the regional security structures and must not stay aside when peacekeeping tasks are being accomplished in the interests o f the world community. The experience o f joint actions within the peacekeeping forces' structure gives a lot o f positive examples o f effective cooperation and successful fu lfil- ment o f the given tasks. This is an indisputable fact. The understanding o f neces- sity o f elaboration and testing o f a unified programme o f operational (combat) training o f international peacekeeping contingents, standardisation o f military and technical materiel and conjunction o f national control means have been reached in the course o f the fulfilment o f the joint tasks. Juxtaposition o f the experiences o f peacekeeping operations has shown that successful fulfilment o f the tasks o f a peacekeeping operation is impossible without systematic informa- tion collection, processing and analysis and issue o f practical recommendations pertaining to its further conduct and perfection. Elaboration o f Fundamentals and Principles o f peacekeeping forces' opera- tional effectiveness estimation utilising the criterion “cost-efficiency” may pro- mote this. The implementation o f this position seems to be possible within the scopes o f joint scientific and research projects o f interested states under the aus- pices o f the P fP programme. There are also other positive examples, though; within the framework o f the future Ru ssia-NATO cooperation it is necessary to concentrate on problems which have been highlighted during the course o f the operations and are the subject o f a thorough analysis to be completely performed in the future.
The main problems highlighted during the course of preparation and conduct of the Multinational Force Operations are:
• shortcomings in elaboration, and in some spheres and directions a complete lack o f legislative and juridical acts on organisation and conduct o f the mul- tinational peacekeeping operations (especially pertaining to peace enforce- ment);
• the absence o f coordinated approaches to a procedure o f force application that frequently results in uncertainty in the organisation of coordinated combat application o f troops (forces);
• presence o f double standards regarding the conflicting parties which arouses mistrust as to the sincerity o f intentions o f the peacekeepers;
• unconformity o f military and civil aspects o f operations which prolongs the time o f their fulfilment;
• lack o f the unified regional situation monitoring system, which affects the results o f activities o f military and civilian components o f the Multinational Forces;
• disharmony in the understanding o f terms and expressions, and staff proce- dures adopted in national armed forces and N A TO ;
• different requirements to personnel training and armament and combat vehi- cles in national contingents that lead to increase o f computational terms and complication o f task fulfilment;
• problems o f compatibility o f troops and armament control means o f N A T O and other countries;
• lack o f a clear organisation o f joint informational and analytical activity o f multinational and national armed forces control organs;
• underestimation o f “ the language barrier” specifying difficulties in control and cooperation o f the national forces.
The experience analysis o f preparation and conduct o f operations by M u lti- national Forces has shown the necessity o f additional research o f problems relat- ing to correlation o f application o f military and non-violent measures aimed at fulfilment o f peace agreements. The research has shown that even in case o f presence o f a powerful Multinational Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, civilian organisations using non-violent measures failed to succeed in the implementation o f the Dayton Agreement by the planned time. The causes o f the failure, which are to be taken into account in future peacekeeping operations, are the following:
• firstly, the international organisations active for years in B & H failed to or- ganise and develop their own infrastructure, the capability to influence on development o f the situation and to co-ordinate activities on numerous civ il- ian bodies;
• secondly, in the absence o f a forcible component such as peacekeeping forces, settlement o f complicated tasks related to stabilisation o f the situa- tion in the conflict zone by non-violent measures was doomed to fail and double standard actions o f civilian organisations could result in an escalation o f the conflict;
• thirdly, the efforts o f the practical activity o f civilian organisations in B & H were not met by sufficient admission o f authority among the local popula- tion.
A s it seems, the goals, terms, forces and means engaged in military and ci- vilian aspects must be closely coordinated during the planning stage o f future peacekeeping operations. The purposes o f peacekeeping operation should be reached by realisation o f a complex o f measures comprising co-ordinated activi- ties starting from the peace-establishing (peace-enforcement) operation up to the moment o f handing over o f control and situation stabilisation functions from military structures to civilian power bodies and withdrawal o f troops from the former conflict zone. Practical realisation o f the above mentioned problems may give an addi- tional impulse to the strategy o f strengthening o f relations between N A T O and Russia, aimed at strengthening o f security in Europe.
Permanent representatives of the parties - non-realised capabilities
The important significance within the framework o f military cooperation be- tween the two parties is proven through the fact that R F Defence Ministry repre- sentatives are active directly in the N A T O structures. The established R F ’ s per- manent military representation in N A T O , including the staff o f the C hie f M ili- tary Representative, continues its activities. Among the most significant results o f its work are elaboration proposals on military cooperation within the JPC framework and on implementation o f basic positions o f the Ru ssia-NATO Basic Act. The Russian representatives participated in the Conference o f N A T O ar- mament directors where the problems connected with realisation o f armament projects and logistics o f the peacekeeping operations were discussed. Flowever, the capability o f the representation can be estimated as low: not attaining the level o f solving problems, mainly organisational, connected with the functioning o f the group within the structure o f the N A T O supreme control body. The business does not extend to the solution o f fundamental problems o f Ru ssia-NATO cooperation. Elaboration, for example, o f the joint military peace- keeping doctrine still remains an idea, together with many other problems, which must be established in the interest o f NATO -Ru ssia military cooperation. The earlier reached agreements about creation o f military missions in M o s- cow and Brussels have not been implemented. The absence o f these missions, especially in Moscow , reduces cooperation effectiveness between military struc- tures o f the parties. Many matters o f operational cooperation with the Alliance cannot be decided in the shortest possible time. Nineteen representations on defence problems at embassies o f the N A T O member countries in Moscow ac- cept responsibility for the solution o f the important problems o f bilateral military cooperation. Nobody can take charge for the solution o f problems on behalf o f the Alliance. The N A T O Documentation Centre on Security Matters, opened in Moscow in February 1998, is entrusted by the authorities only with information o f organisations and citizens o f Russia about general security problems and the state o f affairs in N A TO . Apparently, i f there is a good w ill o f the parties, the technical problems on the establishment o f the missions can be resolved in the shortest possible time, and their activity w ill add a new content to Ru ssia-NATO cooperation.
As already mentioned, the aggression o f N A T O against Yugoslavia has affected Russia-NATO relations. The Russian leadership had to take an unprecedented step, having declared the freezing o f relations in the military sphere and having withdrawn its representatives from the N A T O HQ. N A T O operations in Yugoslavia once again have aggravated problems connected with the N A T O extension to the East and transformation o f the North Atlantic Block.
It is indisputable that, as some experts consider, the N A T O aggression against Yugoslavia had a certain positive value for the forming o f Ru ssia-NATO relations. Both parties, as a result o f the known events, have learned a number o f lessons from that situation; they got rid o f excessive euphoria in an estimation o f the development o f cooperation and irreversible shifts previously seen. On one hand, it has probably slowed down, and in some areas, has frozen fulfilment o f a number o f cooperation programmes, but, on the other, such trials o f relations give new impulses for their development, give new, more realistic and practical bases for them. One year after the ending o f N A TO 's aggression against Yugoslavia, the Ministry o f Defence o f the Russian Federation has restored the full-scale dia- logue with the North Atlantic Alliance. The Russian delegation, headed by M a r- shall I. Sergejev, the R F Defence Minister, present at the Ru ssia-NATO JPC sitting held in Brussels, has proposed its own vision o f future Ru ssia-NATO relations. “ Today we start our activity after almost a one year long interval. The failu re has taken place under the well-known circumstances fo rcing Russia to suspend its relations with the Alliance. This undertaken enforced step was thought out and was adequate in the situation. Nevertheless, we express hope fo r a productive dialogue, based on a thorough account o f past mistakes and an increase o f the positive cooperation poten tial’’ - so were the words o f the De- fence Minister o f the Russian Federation in his speech at the opening o f the JPC meeting. Thus, a short retrospect o f relations between the sides shows that a lot has been done during the past years with regard to extending and intensifying the military cooperation between Russia and N A TO ; however, in many ways the present level o f cooperation between the Russian Federation and the North A t- lantic Treaty Organisation does not meet the requirements for providing firm security and stability in Europe. There is still a risk that the positive steps and agreements reached w ill not be fully implemented. The pessimistic forecast can become true i f N A T O countries w ill unilaterally limit the role o f Russia in the solution o f problems affecting interests o f all European states. T o our great regret, some N A T O representatives occasionally try to interpret the agreements reached in a way that is mainly beneficial to them. They state that the voice o f Russia should be taken into account only at discus- sions on joint operations, conflict prevention actions and antiterrorist activities, which diminishes the Russian role in international affairs.
Looking into the future
The search for mutually acceptable ways for the development o f Ru ssia-NATO relations brings about two alternative models o f cooperation:
• following in a fairway o f western policy; that would partly mean a return to “ Kozyrev’ s era” in Russian foreign policy, which is hardly possible;
• cooperation on the basis o f coordination o f positions and real account o f national interests o f the parties.
Apparently, the responsible politicians connect the future o f Russia-West re- lations with cooperation, offering partnership with allowance for interests and positions o f each party, when the joint search for meeting the solutions o f com mon interest is being conducted. Based on this, Moscow continues to insist on observance o f consensus when major political decisions are taken. The first step in this direction would be a transformation o f the Russia and N A T O JPC into a capable mechanism, ensuring solution o f the European security problems at equal-in-rights participation o f the parties. Further cooperation development in the political and military spheres should be subordinated to settlement o f this very task. In the opinion o f the Russian leadership, cooperation should develop in the following directions:
• elaboration o f a unified security concept for Russia, other CIS countries and N A TO ;
• non-admission o f increase o f the military confrontation level in Central Europe, concentration o f efforts to be aimed at prevention o f dangers and threats in Southern Europe;
• conflict prevention and settlement;
• disarmament and arms control;
• prevention o f proliferation o f weapons o f mass destruction, missile tech- nologies and nuclear materials; • creation o f a nuclear security system;
• fight against all kinds o f terrorism, including nuclear and chemical, as well as against drug smuggling; • information exchange and coordination o f military activities, including m ili- tary defence and budget planning;
• coordination o f military doctrines and joint discussion o f matters pertaining to military building and armed forces reforming;
• harmonisation o f military-political and military-strategic views o f Russia and N A TO ;
• joint research o f problems in maintenance o f global and regional security;
• elaboration o f a regime o f mutual military and technological safety on the basis o f openness, measures o f confidence, equal cooperation in the field o f conversion and development o f a reasonable defence potential;
• solution o f ecological aspects o f military activity; • training o f military personnel, etc.
Along with this, an increase o f cooperation efforts with the North Atlantic Alliance should be staged only with the stress on high priority problems. A ccord- ing to the estimates o f the Russian leadership, N A TO 's expansion and the fight against international terrorism are the main issues among them. These problems require coordinated and thought-out-in-detail actions taking into account the interests o f all parties. That is why the earlier created consultation and views exchange mechanism, as Russian military circles believe, must be transformed into a mechanism o f elaboration o f joint initiatives and joint actions. O f course, it w ill hardly be possible to completely avoid parallelism in the enshrining o f European security. But, both Russia and N A T O must pursue the rules and norms o f international law. The strategic line o f Ru ssia-NATO rapprochement has already been deter- mined. During his visit to Moscow in February 2000, M r G Robertson, the N A T O Secretary General, has described this course as “a system o f gradual steps in a given military-political direction called on by the necessity to act to- gether". The further development o f Ru ssia-NATO relations as a whole can be built according to different models. The first model consists o f maximal usage o f possibilities contained in the Basic Act. The intensification o f relations and the activation o f cooperation using institutional ties between Russia and N A T O seem to be o f priority and a promis- ing direction for cooperation and may be considered the highest stage o f rela- tions between Russia and N A TO . The second model encompasses development o f relations between Russia and N A T O countries through development o f bilateral and trilateral ties. To some extent, this model reflects the concept “o f the detailed cooperation” , which conquers the place in the European integration process. Here, one can specially stress successful development o f Russian-American relations and also the out- lined international security dialogue o f Russia with France and Germany. Any relations leading to the mutually acceptable solutions in the field o f international policy deserve a positive estimation. Therefore, the third model connected with application o f joint efforts in spheres o f common practical inter- est but without formal institute o f such a kind o f cooperation, must also be used. A broad field for such functional cooperation lies open before Russia and the N A T O nations and the development o f a constructive dialogue seems obvious. The forward movement on the way o f development and strengthening o f Ru ssia-NATO cooperation is not supposed to be just “a nice walk” , but w ill be full o f composite problems requiring coordinated and mutually acceptable solu- tions. Matters pertaining to the 1972 Antimissile Defence Treaty w ill be o f special importance to the future o f Ru ssia-NATO relations. A t first glance, this matter concerns only Russia and the U SA , but the whole complex o f Russia-West rela- tions depends on its solution, as the US voice is the decisive one in N A T O . Recent events show that all questions pertaining to matters prohibited by the Antimissile Treaty in terms o f deployment o f an antimissile defence by the United States have been practically settled. The signing by President B. Clinton o f the appropriate law has put this problem “ into the rank o f state policy o f the U S A ” . Though the final decision about the beginning o f deployment o fficially is pending there are no solid grounds to count on that the United States w ill abstain from the idea o f creation o f a national antimissile defence. In other words, the process o f the US antimissile defence deployment, as far as it can be judged today, possessed a practically irreversible character. The deployment o f antimissile defence by the United States on its territory w ill create a new situation, principally in relations between Moscow and Wash- ington, in the field o f strategic arms. The selection o f regions for system de- ployment (Alaska, Grand Fox Airbase, North Dakota) shows its purpose - to intercept ballistic missiles launched, first o f all, from the territories o f Russia and China. Expression o f Russian concern about the US military policy does not at all mean that Moscow attempts “ to hammer a wedge” between Washington and Brussels. In Russia it is clearly realised that the European Community w ill not support the creation o f counterbalances for the U S A and Europe, and Russian relations with some Alliance countries w ill appear discredited. A ll this w ill sig- nificantly affect the development o f relations between the North Atlantic A lli- ance and Russia. Russia is against returning to the times o f the Cold War. Further relations with N A T O w ill depend to a degree on Russia’ s conviction in sincerity o f the Alliance's intentions to restore the relations and in its readiness to count M o s- cow's vision o f European Security, o f forms and methods o f its construction. Russia still adheres to the position that there is no alternative to cooperation with the North Atlantic Union and reckons on the development o f equivalent and constructive relations between the parties. However, these relations should not be reduced to only a discussion and an information exchange and merely create a view o f progress in the business o f maintenance o f European security. Creation o f a non-strategic anti-missile system, which already has been pro- posed by the President o f the Russian Federation, M r V Putin, during his visit to Italy, might be a considerable step in the direction o f joint preservation o f Euro- pean security. Russia considers it principally important that the European non-strategic antimissile system would not create new boundaries o f mistrust, opposition and confrontation. Along with this it is also important that the proposal o f the Rus- sian leadership does not pursue intentions to make the West European states dependent on the Russian anti-missile technologies. The realisation o f this project opens a broad field for cooperation. In case o f a positive attitude o f Western states to Russian initiatives, it would be possible to discuss concrete directions o f further action, among which the following should be given special attention: joint estimation o f character and extent o f the missile dissemination and possible missile threats; joint elaboration o f concepts o f an all- European non-strategic anti-missile system, succession o f its build-up and de- ployment; joint creation o f an all-European missile warning multipurpose centre, joint staff training; conduct o f joint researches and experiments; joint develop- ment o f non-strategic anti-missile defence; creation and formation o f the non-strategic anti-missile defence for the joint or coordinated actions to protect the forces and the civilian population. It is very important for the further relations to join efforts on non- proliferation o f weapons o f mass destruction anc missile technologies. In this sphere, the partnership between Russia and N A T O must be developed in the direction o f imposing a very strict control over sale o f “double” -purpose tech- nologies and the most destructive kinds o f conventional weapons, first o f all in zones o f armed conflicts. The Russian leadership expects that these problems w ill be met with sympathy. However, some actions o f the Western states directly contradict the national interests and security o f Russia. The huge damage to the whole system o f international measures on nuclear restraint has been caused by the decision o f the US Congress about non-ratification o f the Universal Nuclear Tests Ban Treaty. It has threatened the process o f preparations for negotiations on a fission materials production ban. The future o f Ru ssia-NATO relations the Russian leadership is not simply connected with an increase o f the quantity o f measures in separate directions, but with a change o f the contents o f these relations. In the basis o f these expectations lies a comprehension o f the necessity o f political transformation o f the North Atlantic Alliance. It is not a secret for anybody that the discussion about N A T O expansion which took place several years ago has overshadowed the problem o f further evolution o f the North Atlantic Treaty: its adaptation to “actual European security needs” .
Nevertheless, this reform has matured and participants to the North Atlantic Treaty speak about its necessity. And though there is a point o f view about the necessity o f a closer interaction o f N A T O and the O S C E and other European structures, the idea o f strengthening the Alliance's role dominates. N A T O leader- ship assigns the Block with the role o f the only guarantor o f European security, capable o f providing and fixing the new world order as the mono-vector system o f interstate relations. The assertion o f N A T O on a role o f Collective Security System actually authorises substitution o f the O S C E by the North Atlantic Treaty. This idea is counterproductive. Such a system without a membership for Russia is not regarded desirable. Even more so, the block system as a reliable global and regional stability and security guarantor has exhausted itself. Under the new conditions, the more expedient alternative variant o f such a system is the widening and strengthening o f cooperation both within the scope o f the U N and the scope o f other international and regional organisations. W hile delimiting as priority spheres o f cooperation the political and military areas and drawing attention to the difficulties which can be met on the way o f Ru ssia-NATO partnership relations forming because o f the existence o f complex political and military problems, we must not be limited only by this, though. The strengthening o f confidence measures in the field o f regional security is an important direction for the development o f relations between Russia and N A T O . The concept “ confidence measures” has no strict definition in Russia or in foreign scientific literature. Nevertheless, this expression has occupied a strong place in the dictionary o f international political terminology. A s mentioned by B. George, the British Parliament member, in “ N A T O Review ” maga- zine (1991) "... with the waning o f "the C old War", confidence and security measures have obtained new tasks in new Europe: to demonstrate mutual deter- mination to strengthen trust and security instead o f to simply authentically testify the absence o f threats, to promote stabilisation o f the process o f change o f rela- tions o f the states in the security sphere .. The modern measures o f the all-European confidence and security take their root in the Helsinki Act. They have received further development in the final document o f the Stockholm Conference and the Vienna negotiations. In accordance with the (1999) Vienna documents signed by Russia and N A T O , the protocols o f confidence measures have been grouped into the follow ing categories: annual information exchange (in particular about plans o f arma- ment deployment and military budgets); risk-decreasing mechanisms; military contacts; preliminary notifications; invitation o f observers; limitation o f military activity; observance and control. Principally important from the point o f increasing confidence measures between Russia and N A T O is the fulfilment o f three categories o f the Vienna Document - pre-notifications, invitation o f observers and limitations. In accordance with the norms stated in the last version o f the Vienna D ocu- ment, the 42-day pre-notification about operations with participation o f more than 9,000 men, 250 tanks, 500 combat vehicles or 250 artillery systems is obligatory. This norm applies to the whole o f Europe and also to the states o f Central Asia. The observance o f the notification regime eliminates the concern o f the parties about dangerous military activity near the state borders. For an invitation o f observers, the threshold values stipulate 13,000 persons, 900 tanks, 500 armoured vehicles or 250 artillery systems. The presence o f ob- servers makes it possible to determine to what kind o f activities the armed forces are getting ready. Are there aggressive intentions in the forms and methods o f their actions? What kind o f armament is preponderant - types to be used for offensive or defensive purposes? A s for the limitation o f military activity, the threshold values have been formed as follows: not more than one operation with participation o f more than 40,000 men, 900 tanks or 2,000 armoured vehicles in three years; not more than six operations with participation o f from 3,000 to 40,000 men, 300-900-tanks or 500-2000 armoured vehicles per year. The increase o f military activity above the established limits makes it possible for both Russia and the N A T O to obtain clear answers to the question - what is the reason for such activity? Although the responsibility for maintenance and development o f confidence measures has been entrusted to the OSCE , the actual responsibility for their im plementation is borne by Russia and N A T O within the frameworks o f their m ili- tary activity, because they have the largest groupings o f armed forces. The important aspect o f cooperation lies in the military-technical field. T ill now, Russian and N A T O attempts to create joint armament systems were ine ffi- cient. This fact, however, to a greater extent testifies more to the presence o f problems o f political and commercial character than to poor potential or the absence o f corresponding needs. The Russian component may be useful for Europe to increase the degree o f autonomy. In separate directions the coopera- tion can be extremely useful and expedient to both N A T O and Russia. On the basis o f mutually beneficial cooperation, Russia and N A T O can make a con- structive contribution to the building o f a new W orld Order. Despite current Russian financial difficulties, there are good conditions for cooperation in the military-technical field.
Firstly, from the historical point o f view, Russia is traditionally strong in production o f new types o f armament and combat vehicles. The Kalashnikov sub-machinegun, the T-34 tank, and the “ Katiysha” rocket launcher have been recognised as the best in the W orld and have for a long time served as basic models for different armies o f the world.
Secondly. With the termination o f ideological confrontation o f the Cold War era, Russia has preserved scientific and technological backlogs, permitting it to make technological breakthroughs not only to the X X Is t century but also to the new millennium. For example, analyses o f main technological directions o f the world's science and technique have shown that 69 Russian manufacturers in the field o f military technology do not yield to the best world analogues and 13 oc- cupy the leading positions in the world.
Thirdly. Quality and specifications o f Russian samples o f armament and combat vehicles allow to upgrade the existing arms and combat materiel, several times increasing their capabilities and adapting to new standards.
Fourthly. The compatibility o f Russia's and N A T O ’ s adopted and future models o f armament and combat materiel makes it possible to use the Russian scientific and technological potential directly in the interest o f new N A T O mem- bers. For these countries, as a rule lacking finances for purchase o f armament and combat materiel in the West, modernising Russian models and bringing them in conformity with the N A T O standards is the most rational way to main- tain the defence potential on the appropriate level. Russia can participate in a modernisation programme o f aircraft, armoured vehicles, reconnaissance and control means and many other sorts o f armament and combat materiel.
Fifthly. Russia is ready to render services and technologies on safety control o f ammunition storage, chemical charges, nuclear means, liquidation and utilisa- tion o f armament and combat materiel.
Outlining prospects for military and technical cooperation, it is necessary to carefully and comprehensively analyse the available possibilities. The principal positions providing balance o f military-political and economic interests o f the parties, excluding inflicting damage to national security o f all participants to the process, must be put into the basis o f the decisions taken in this field. Expansion o f mutually beneficial historically formed cooperation ties be- tween enterprises and organisations o f military-industrial complexes o f Russia and interested states is considered by Moscow to be o f priority in the military and technical cooperation.
The joint and coordinated protection o f intellectual property in the field o f m ili- tary science and engineering is considered to be a rather important direction o f military-technical cooperation. It would not be an exaggeration if we state that non-material values o f Russia such as new technologies, scientific discoveries in the field o f new materials, devices and constructions have not been protected yet and are the subject o f the non-authorised "piratical" usage. No doubt that this problem worries not only Russia, but also all industrially developed states. But for Russia, in view o f the complicated economic situation, this problem is very real. Hoping that the N A T O leadership is also interested in protection o f "the national" intellectual property, it would be expedient to discuss preparation o f a Russia-NATO agreement on this subject, as the initial practical step, and sign it within the next few years. Moscow hopes for a positive dialogue on protection o f intellectual activity products obtained in the former USSR, and now used by the Alliance candidate countries. Settlement o f this problem with the help o f the N A T O structures, in view o f the armament and materiel modernisation planned by the states o f Cen- tral and Eastern Europe, is very important to Moscow . An early initiation o f such a dialogue meets the interests o f both parties. There are also broad Ru ssia-NATO cooperation prospects in other fields - humanitarian, ecological, scientific, etc. As a matter o f fact, these activity spheres transform into one o f the fundamentals o f the outlined multi-sided NATO -Russia cooperation. Russia and the Western countries already possess experience o f implementation o f a number o f practical measures in the field o f science, environmental protection, planning o f employment o f civil services in extraordinary situations, retraining o f the retired military personnel and in some aspects o f conversion o f enterprises o f the defence industry. The programmes mentioned also envisage the struggle against international terrorism, safe storage o f nuclear arsenals, prevention o f spread o f nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. A ll this indicates that the given direction o f the N A T O non-military activi- ties represents a sphere o f considerable coincidence o f interests o f the parties involved and can serve as a connecting element o f the developing Ru ssia-NATO cooperation. Matters o f security, ecology, science, and other aspects more and more often become subjects o f such cooperation. It gives reason to consider that it w ill possess not a tactical, but the stable and long-term character, capable o f rendering a beneficial influence on other, including the military-political, aspects o f N A T O activities and their interaction in this field with Russia. Putting today on the agenda and achieving agreements on ecological, scien- tific, educational and other aspects belonging to “ the third basket” o f N A T O activities, involving into their realisation the Block countries, w ill make it easier tomorrow to put on the agenda military-political matters pertaining to our rela- tions with the Block, including problems o f minimisation o f possible negative consequences o f its expansion to the East.
There are a lot o f problems on the way to close and constructive cooperation. Along with this, Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance can and must act to- gether to achieve common goals o f safeguarding peace and security in the New Europe. By joining efforts, both parties w ill benefit from mutual cooperation. Due to its development in different spheres, it seems possible to break old stereo- types, hampering the parties in usage o f the not completely realised relations potential. A s it was said by M r A Kvashnin, C hie f o f the General Staff o f the Armed Forces o f the Russian Federation in one o f his interviews to “The Red Star” newspaper: “ ... it's my deep belie f that the cooperation o f Russia with the N A TO countries should spread and extend in a ll directions. It is dictated by the objective needs o f each party and the developing situation. It should gain a irre- versible character and be based on the real and equivalent consideration o f the interests o f one another". The other party also realises this. So, M r G Robertson, the N A T O Secretary General in his statement on results o f his visit to Russia has pointed out that “Russia and N A TO are fully determined to introduce their contribution to build- ing a unified, free and indivisible Europe fo r the good o f a ll peoples. ” However, this main route is not at all covered with roses, and both parties have to overcome a serious test, as confirmed by the previous dialogue experi- ence,. The existing, yet very serious contradictions, are causes to expand coop- eration, not to narrow down the dialogue. Ten years after the termination o f the Cold War, on the threshold o f the X X Is t century, relations between N A T O and Russia should turn into a genuine strategic partnership. Today, the W orld deals with the New Russia, new and fundamentally reformed. She steadily pursues the way o f democratic development, strives for cooperation, partner relations with all countries and rightly expects the same from others.
