Denne artikel er udarbejdet på baggrund af generalmajor J.F. Deverell foredrag ved Konferencen for Tjenestestedschefer. Generalen er i øjeblikket chef for den britiske hærs officersskole Sandhurst.
There is often a mismatch between what is predicted and what comes to pass. Complete libraries of prophetic books have been written in which the human race achieves extraordinary technological and social advancement. Such prophecies normally prove to be beyond our grasp, and yet within these writings there are often predictions that are realised, for good or ill. But in looking back 50 years it is clear that whilst much has changed enormously, many aspects of life have hardly changed at all. Those who have tried to anticipate changes in military philosophy and practice have often found success equally elusive. But as Churchill once said “You had better take change by the hand, otherwise it will take you by the throat”. The military community, not least the British, is often thought of as being conservative in outlook. As a criticism, this sometimes stems from a superficial understanding of the nature and complexity of war, and the immense risks involved in a country committing itself to war. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, many have questioned whether the armed forces, as they are currently structured, will be able to deal with the military challenges that lie ahead. Some are also querying whether the qualities that we currently seek in our military leaders are those that we shall need in the year 2000 and beyond. What is immediately obvious is that the year 2000 is only 5 years away. We have already recruited, selected and, to a greater or lesser degree, trained those who will be our senior officers up to the year 2025-2030. If there are fundamental changes in the qualities of leadership required between now and then, we are already too late. In seeking to identify what changes, if any, might become necessary in the theory and practice of military leadership to meet the challenges of the new millennium, I intend to identify the trends that have influenced the evolution of leadership in the past and, in so doing, attempt to draw some conclusions as to the future. The perspective will be largely British, and there are two particular aspects of the British armed forces that exercise a substantial influence on the way that I view the question of military leadership. Firstly, apart from such things as naval “press gangs” and other unethical or illegal methods of forcing individuals to join the armed forces, there have been only approximately 20 years of national conscription during the past 350. Thus the volunteer ethos has always been, and remains, very strong. Secondly, there has been only one year (19Ö8) since 1945, in which a soldier has not been killed on operational service. As a result, the Army has a considerable depth of operational experience, mostly at low level. From the end of the Korean War, the Cold War put the international situation into a straight-jacket and placed severe constraints upon diplomacy. The ‘insane’ logic of nuclear deterrence dissuaded the major powers from direct conflict, and where national interest was presumed to be threatened outside the confines of Western Europe, resolution was often sought through the efforts of one or more proxy protagonists. The scope of these conflicts was limited, though the level of violence was often extreme. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, military commanders were faced with a largely unchanging situation: the “comforting certainties” of the Cold War. All this changed in 1989, and 18 months later the Gulf War was fought, something which would have been highly improbable, if not impossible, a year before. Does this new situation in which we find ourselves represent such a profound change to the military environment that military commanders will have to alter the way they exercise leadership in the future? Before we can address this question, we need to define what leadership is for and what does it do? Field Marshal Montgomery defined leadership as:
“The will to dominate, together with the character that inspires confidence”.
President Truman as:
“A leader is a man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don't want to do and like it”.
Field Marshal Slim as:
“Leadership is a mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion...in fact it is just plain you”.
In another quote, Sir John Harvey-Jones, an ex-Royal Navy pilot but more famous as an industrialist, defines leadership as follows:
“I lead by example and persuasion and a hell of a lot of hard work, not on the basis of power or authority. My skills are to help a large number of people to release their energies and focus themselves. It is switching on a lot of people and helping them to achieve the common aim. People only do things they are convinced about, one has to create the conditions in which people want to give of their best.”
There is little or no difference between these definitions apart from emphasis. In many ways they say as much about the personality of the writer as they say about leadership, and they can just as easily be applied to other professions. But we could define leadership as that which gives a group its essential direction and cohesion. The study of leadership is often centred upon the qualities required to be a leader. What does the person have to be, rather than what does he have to do? Field Marshal Slim, the US Army, and Field Marshal Harding selected the following lists as being the essential qualities of a leader.
The first point of interest is that of all the qualities mentioned, only three are common to each list; courage, initiative, and integrity, though they are arguably the most important. The second is that there is no conflict between the qualities in any of the three lists. Thirdly, both Slim's and Harding's lists are at least 40 years old, thus have stood the test of time. Almost all could as easily be applied to Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Hitler, or Stalin; as they could to Montgomery or Eisenhower. However, the qualities of "integrity" and "justice" are an explicit reference to the moral element of leadership which is the crucial difference between military command and “gangsterism”. Though there is a need to try to break down leadership into its component parts, both to improve our understanding, and to provide a vehicle by which we can teach, the process tends to create artificial divisions between human qualities that are themselves difficult to define accurately. It is also difficult to apply any sensible weighting to individual qualities. An abundance of one quality in a senior officer may be a good thing; in a junior officer it may be a positive hindrance. British military doctrine states that fighting power is based upon physical, conceptual and moral components, and that command is split it into three separate parts: leadership, control and decision making; what the leader has to be, and what the leader has to do. Thus, though leadership provides direction and cohesion, it is not in itself command. What a leader has to do will depend upon the situation in which he finds himself, and the tools that he is given to do the job. What he has to be, presents a far more difficult question. We must now look back in time to see whether the definitions and qualities of leadership that we have selected have remained constant through the ages, and what factors have influenced them in the past. Amongst primitive tribes, there are well documented examples of tribal leaders exercising a restraining influence during conflict to prevent bloodshed from getting out of hand. Paradoxically, the development of more sophisticated economic and political structures resulted in more violent rather than less violent war. Military and political leaders were very often one and the same person and a “heroic style” of leadership developed: Alexander the Great exemplified this. His soldiers expected him to be where the battle was at its most fierce, and such was his political and military significance that he was the "point of main effort", whether he wanted to be or not. But like all commanders of his time, once battle was joined he found it almost impossible to exercise any control in the way that we would understand it. In the maelstrom of swords, shields and spears, there was no way that he could influence events apart from inspiring his troops by his courage. His leadership and control skills were exercised in sustaining his army in the field and committing it to battle under the most favourable circumstances. However, the “heroic style” had its critics. Onasander, writing his book "The General" in AD 58, said:
“The general should fight cautiously rather than boldly, or should keep away altogether from a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. .. he can aid his army far less by fighting than he can harm it if he should be killed, since the knowledge of a general is far more important than his physical strength”.
Julius Caesar held similar views though even he, on occasions was forced to adopt a more direct approach:
Caesar started for the right wing where saw his men under great pressure.. . . Caesar saw that the situation was critical, and there was no reserve to throw in. He snatched a shield from a soldier in the rear. . and moved to the frontline.... His coming inspired the men with hope and gave them new heart.
So, in an age of similar political and cultural structures, when command and control on the battlefield was at its most basic, different styles of leadership were already beginning to develop. By the time of Wellington and Napoleon, command and control had improved only marginally. Weapons, on the other hand, had improved substantially, and thus the battlefield had become much larger. The commander, however, still had to be able to see most of, if not all, the battle he was fighting. Wellington is quoted as having said:
"the reason why I succeeded., .is because I was always on the spot. I saw everything and did everything myself'.
Because they were exposed to direct enemy fire and often in full view of their own soldiers, commanders of that era tended to be part of the same "heroic style" as Alexander and his contemporaries. But the pressure of increasingly accurate and effective weapon systems and better communications, as well as the cultural and political changes that were occurring in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, was to exercise a profound effect upon the way senior commanders conducted their business. In spite of the enhancements to communication systems between 1914-1918 they were still not effective enough to allow commanders to control the enormous armies that were generated and sustained by the industrialisation of war. Nor were the communications flexible enough to allow the proper integration of combat arms needed to break the stalemate of trench warfare, in the way the Germans would do 22 years later. The size and complexity of the armies meant that the separation of senior commanders and their staffs from their soldiers was already well established. Generals were content to commit their men to battle, but increasingly cut off from the reality of what was actually happening. Major General JFC Fuller, a constant critic of "chateau generalship" wrote:
"the most rapid way to shell-shock an army is to shell-proof its generals; for once the heart of an army is severed from its head the result is paralysis"
"One of the most valuable qualities of a commander is a flair for putting himself in the right place at the vital time".
Given the remarkable improvements in the gathering and passage of information, and the accuracy and destructiveness of modern weapon systems during the last 50 years, it is hardly surprising that senior commanders increasingly choose to fight the battle from some secure bunker out of harm's way. Indeed, many would say that they presently have little choice in the matter, and find it more and more difficult to escape from the constraints of their information and communication systems. But there are examples of senior commanders who believe that their physical presence on the battlefield is important. In the Second World War, Wingate, Rommel, and Patton, to name but three, cultivated this latter day "heroic" style. By contrast there were others, equally effective, who remained remote from the battlefield. No one has suggested that the “heroic style” should be completely dispensed with. As long as some element of the armed forces has to close with the enemy, then attributes such as courage, loyalty, integrity, decisiveness, will be at a premium among those officers and NCOs in fighting units. Does this mean that the "heroic style" is dead for senior commanders? Many senior commanders take great pains to be seen by their soldiers, sometimes taking unnecessary risks. But it may become an increasingly difficult judgement between the commander being at the heart of the command web, and being out seeing for himself and being seen, at least in part, to bear the same dangers and discomforts as his soldiers. It may be that the choice is more a reflection of the commander's personality and character than the situation in which he finds himself There are, of course other factors which have exerted a profound influence on the style of military leadership. Perhaps one of the most important being social change. For a man to join the Army as a soldier in Victorian England was often seen as a family disgrace. To be an officer was not a great deal better. Field Marshal Robertson, the only Chief of the Imperial General Staff to rise from the rank of Private Soldier, through Warrant Officer, to Field Marshal, was written to by his Mother when he joined the 16th Lancers in 1877. She said: "I would rather you were buried than you wore the red coat of a soldier. " The Army was full of criminals, drunkards, runaways and social misfits. On the other hand it also provided the only escape for many honest and principled men from the intense deprivations of 19th Century urban and rural life. It is sometimes said that if the current British Army rules about criminality had applied to Wellington's army, he would have been very lonely at Waterloo. Indeed, Wellington had such a horror of ill-disciplined soldiers that he opposed, to the end of his life in 1858, any move to prevent soldiers being subject to hanging and flogging. But society was being increasingly influenced by more liberal views, much feared and attacked by the forces of reaction at the time, but dearly evident by the increasing amount of legislation put in place during the latter part of the 19th and the first part of the 20th century, designed to protect the rights of individuals. One of the most important manifestations of this was the concept of state education. Better education of society as a whole and, therefore, of those who joined the Army meant that they could be more easily and more effectively trained, and assume greater responsibility. These changes, allied with the increasing mobility of people and growing aspirations, began to have a similar impact an the style of leadership as the improvements in weapons and communications. Another substantial influence has been changes in the way that states have used force to resolve discord. From primitive war, through barbarian raiders and the world wars of the 20th century, to the use of irregulars in wars of national liberation; change has been a constant feature. For the last 160 years, Clausewitz has been seen by European powers and the United States, as a seminal military philosopher. His statement about "war being an extension of politics by other means" has fitted, very conveniently, the wars between nation states since Napoleon. Though the French Revolutionary wars provided the first example of"total war" namely the direction of all available resources of the state to the prosecution of war, Clausewitz encouraged the use of increasingly violent and all embracing methods in conflicts between nation states. The concept of the decisive battle, using all the assets of the state, to destroy the enemy's army and thus their means and will to resist, contrasted with the more constrained and formalised military philosophy of the 18th century. We have seen, to a greater or lesser degree, the continuation of his ideas up until the present day. The Cold War fitted this pattern, to the extent that the potential war would have been so 'decisive' that no one was prepared to fight it! The Gulf probably fits the Clausewitzian view, but does Bosnia, Somalia, Angola or Rwanda? As eminent a military historian as John Keegan now doubts whether the Clausewitzian template will be as useful a guide in the future as it appears to have been in the past. So far we have identified that leadership styles have proved susceptible to changes in political philosophy and structures, culture, social attitudes, and technology. But the qualities required of a leader have hardly changed at all; Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, and Wellington would have all recognised them and been confident that they possessed them in abundance. This is hardly surprising because they tend to be the generically "good" human qualities. Who would dream of putting "Cunning" down as a quality of leadership? It smacks too much of dishonesty. And yet probably all great commanders have a streak of cunning that enables them to outwit their adversaries, or even just to get their way during political in-fighting. Now to the future. Professor Kurt Gastigeier, a Swiss strategic writer, sees the threats to world order in the following terms: the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact released the brake. Ideas of strategic balance, and spheres of influence suddenly seem outdated. A multiplication of what he calls "actors" and "issues" have made international relations far more complex and less controllable. And if this is not bad enough, the "actors" whether they are states, religious or ethnic groups, or even organised crime, have at their disposal the military means, and the determination and will to use them. This has the potential to cause substantial security problems for other states, international organisations, and existing alliances. It is also likely that issues will be far more difficult to resolve, particularly because they are likely to be predominantly intra-state. In the same way pressure will increase on countries confronted by population increase, climatic change, and increasing nationalism. The scramble for natural resources, particularly water, will become even more acute as countries attempt to develop their economies. Such complexities may not be immediately apparent to, nor readily understandable by, the public at home. It will, therefore, become all the more difficult to convince people why it is necessary to commit troops in support of operations in a "faraway place of which we know little."
From this analysis, there is a growing view that nation states will become less inclined to go to war for territorial or political reasons. There is a increasing sensitivity to the human and material cost of war, particularly amongst developed countries. Society is becoming less resilient to casualties. Losses suffered in the course of an operation not believed to be directly in the national interest, may be increasingly difficult to sustain. Politicians, to ensure public support, will inflate the expectation of a speedy, successful and relatively casualty free operations, as we had in the Gulf. Fewer people will understand the inevitability of Clausewitz's “friction of war”, resulting in reverses and losses. This will be exacerbated by the immediacy and impact of television pictures and news reports and the tone of the coverage: detached and questioning. Political sensitivity and a growing lack of military experience in public life will add to the problems that confront contemporary commanders. Unclear political and military objectives, limitations on commander's freedom of action, and interference in the tactical battle, may be just some of the difficulties that may emerge. On the other hand, it does not sound very different to some of the problems that confronted Wellington in the Peninsula. His dispatches written between 1808 and 1814 are often concerned with interfering politicians with hidden agendas, inefficient and penny-pinching civil servants, incompetent officers, and poorly trained and ill-disciplined soldiers. You may feel that I have painted far too dark a picture here. Most countries that have deployed troops to the former Republic of Yugoslavia have actually been remarkably steady in the face of the deaths, injury and hostage taking. But I believe the trend is against us. Some of the most profound changes are taking place in the society from which the armed forces are drawn. The relationship between the armed forces of a state and the public vary from country to country. Given that those who enlist, and this may be more noticeable where there is conscription rather than a volunteer army, bring with them many of the current attitudes of society. With 75% of British officer cadets at Sandhurst being graduates, with an average commissioning age of 23 and a half, their personalities and characters are largely formed. In comparison to previous generations, they are less physically and mentally robust and are often unsettled as much by the mental challenge of physical activity as the physical Activity itself. At school and home they are encouraged to seek alternative options if their initial choice becomes difficult. There is more stigma attached to failing than voluntarily withdrawing from training, and they are not used to being told what to do and being expected to do it. They are often, however, desperately seeking the structured and value based society that the Army offers, but are still inclined to choose those standards they find most convenient and reject some of the others. However, it is the battle between the "Gesellschaft" and the "Gemeinschaft" culture that I contend is one of our greatest problems. If society really does begin to support the view that individual rights are more important than the common good, it will set the armed forces some very demanding challenges. Indeed, the contradictions may become so great that the military ethos is debased and the usefulness of the armed forces substantially degraded. Armed forces, with their requirement for duty and obedience, have to establish and sustain that they have the right to be different from the rest of society. In Britain it is as much the pressure of legislation, some national and some European, that is causing current problems. Much of it is drawn up to meet the demands of the civilian workplace and is largely unsuited to the military environment. By definition, armed forces work in dangerous places, and commanders will often be required to make the training environment hazardous in order to prepare their soldiers for operations. Are we to put safety nets on obstacle courses, or further reduce the realism of field-firing? If we do, it is likely that this will reduce effectiveness and raise the number of unnecessary casualties on operations. The considerable increase in people taking us to court is all part of this same trend. At the moment common sense prevails, but for how long? We addressed earlier the impact improvements in technology have on style of command? The range, speed of engagement and effectiveness of current weapon systems puts at the commander's fingertips massive combat power, but with it, great responsibility. The combat power of the "Tornado" aircraft is many times that of its predecessors, thus the loss of a comparatively small number of RAF "Tornado" aircraft in the Gulf was the cause of substantial concern. It was as much about tactical doctrine and loss of capability as human casualties. The cost and value of modern weapon systems is such that they can no longer be used in the same way as a greater number of less sophisticated weapons were used previously. As the value of weapons increase, the responsibility for committing them tends to rise up the command chain. The extraordinary increase in the capacity of surveillance, target acquisition, communications and information systems has given the commander an almost unlimited scope to see "the other side of the hill", and to direct his own battle. But his decisions have become more visible to the outside world and this increases the pressure on the commander and his decision-making processes. There is potential for interference in the tactical battle and those tempted to interfere will often be under pressure from politicians, bureaucrats, senior military officers, both serving and retired, and vociferous members of the public, often with their own agendas, who believe that they understand the problem and have the solution - courtesy of CNN! Given the uncertainty of future scenarios it is likely that military forces will find themselves inappropriately structured and equipped for the task that they have been set. It is paradoxical that the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, established to fight a high-intensity war, is much more likely to be used in peacekeeping, or peace enforcement. As much of its equipment will have been designed to meet the high intensity end of conflict, it may either be unsuitable, or of value only in a totally different role. An example of this is the"Warrior"IFV in Bosnia. Its success has been as much the protection it offers, as its mobility and firepower. Does the impact of technology mean that we will require a different sort of soldier? In one sense improving technology should mean that we need less intelligent soldiers, as systems becoming easier to use and maintain. But as capability increases, so does the system's value. The soldier must have the wit to use the equipment in the most effective way. The modern soldier must also be able to cope with a situation when his equipment either does not work, or it performs well below the standard which is expected. He cannot afford to be “technologically fragile”. He must be physically and mentally robust enough to fall back on plain common sense and courage if he finds that his head-up display, anti-mine boots, climatically controlled suit, and weapon that can fire around corners is of no value when confronted by a large crowd of women and children armed with sticks and stones. He must also be intelligent enough to understand that operations in the future are more likely to be the subject of external interference. Such interference may be in conflict with the military decision-making processes, and may even distort his operational procedures. Above all, both he and his commanders must be able to cope with chaos, reversal or failure. Another element which has changed immensely in the past 30 years is the propensity for all parts of a military operation to be judged against a political agenda. The most senior commanders have always had to cope with political reality. At the highest level they have always been the interface between the politician and the soldier. But only in the recent past have the actions of low level commanders and their soldiers become so politically sensitive. It will almost certainly be too much to expect soldiers to have a detailed understanding of the political Situation, but they need, at least, a feeling for the likely implications of their actions. If operations are to be effectively and sensitively conducted under these circumstances, there is a requirement for low level commanders, and by this I mean right down to section commander, to be able to discriminate between an order that must be obeyed (not a word we hear very often today) and one that needs to be interpreted to suit a particular situation. Commanders in Bosnia, Angola, Cambodia are doing this every day; Young officers and NCOs in the British Army have been doing it for 27 years in Northern Ireland. It is a culture rather than a procedure, and has to be cultivated and encouraged. As such, it may be more appropriate to a long service, volunteer army rather than a conscripted army. It is certainly not easy to teach that sort of judgement - apart from through experience, and experience is liable to become an expensive commodity in the situations that we may find ourselves in. Having looked at the environment in which commanders may be working post the year 2000, there appears to be no compelling reason why the qualities that we require in our leaders should change in the future. The balance between them will vary depending on the level of command. Given the changes in society, we may find that those who join in the future may have a different understanding of the meaning of some of the qualities such as “loyalty”, “unselfishness”, or “team spirit”; and their relative importance balanced against the others. The only additions might be, although they are implicit in the existing qualities, are “intelligence” and, perhaps more important, “imagination”. It is difficult to see how a future commander can cope if he does not possess the ability to approach his tasks in an imaginative way. It is the style of leadership that has been most susceptible to change over the centuries and will probably continue to change in the future. It is more a question of what the leader does, rather than what he is. So long as they have the ability, they are trainable. The British have often lagged behind other armies in the training of senior commanders. It is something that we can no longer afford to do. In multinational operations, commanders will have to contend with other national military and political agenda, and the intense scrutiny and dissection of their decisions by a plethora of institutions outside the chain of command. Thus the first and over-riding stipulation is that the commander must be physically and mentally robust. To prepare a commander specifically for this is essential and probably not difficult, but there is also a requirement to prepare the staff to support him. I would argue that we must start to encourage officers to be more imaginative in the way they approach problems from early on in their career. Now that we have managed to escape from the sterility of repeated exercises in Germany, we have a chance to make training for high intensity operations more demanding for the commanders. In the same way, continuing to train for high intensity operations, even though the likelihood is that the reality will be something less; breeds confidence that you can move up a gear with some ease if required, and that you can survive whatever is thrown at you. Commanders of all ranks need to be exposed to greater levels of uncertainty during training so that they become used to exercising and trusting their judgement. There is still a tendency to test what the commander knows, rather than how he uses that knowledge. If situations are to become less predictable and thus subject to radical change as operation continues, the art of improvisation becomes increasingly important. There has been a recent attempt to identify a British style of command. It proved elusive, to say the least. But one common theme which came through was that British commanders are expected to be improvisers. They are expected to patch things up when, as they surely will, things go wrong. Wellington made a revealing comment when talking about French marshals. He said:
“They planned their campaigns just as you might make a splendid harness; it looks very well, it answers very well, until it gets broken - and then you are done for. Now I made my campaigns of rope; if anything went wrong I tied a knot in it.”
His concept of 'fighting the battle' as it developed, rather than to a predetermined pattern was neatly summarised before Waterloo. In reply to Lord Uxbridge's question as to what his plans were for the day. He said:
“Well, Uxbridge, Bonaparte has not given me any ideas of his projects, and as my plans entirely depend on them, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?”
“One thing is certain Uxbridge, that is whatever happens, you and I today will do our duty.”
Of course, Wellington had chosen the ground on which he was to fight the battle and had deployed his regiments in a way that protected them from one of Napoleon's most potent assets, his artillery. He was also very experienced. But the flexibility of his approach and his willingness to improvise may be a pointer for us entering a more uncertain future. A more contemporary example is the improvisation shown by the Germans on the Eastern Front and in North West Europe during the last war. Ironically, this was a time when improvisation and flexibility was not a particular British virtue. As bas already been discussed, commanders will be under immense pressure to try to give a multi-national force direction and cohesion, made all the more complex by working to an international organisation, or a potentially fragile and hastily puttogether coalition. There will be substantial differences in the way other nation's officers and soldiers carry out their duties, plus the political infighting and organisational inertia that seems to be endemic in such situations. The debilitating effects of such an environment could be ameliorated by exposure to such organisations earlier in an officer's career, though this does run the risk of the organisation subverting the officer, rather than the other way round! Coping with social change is, at present, probably the greatest challenge that armies face and senior commanders have a great responsibility to sustain the critical elements of military ethos that enable an army to go to war. It has to be said that we sometimes do our cause no good by defending practises that are peripheral to this. We must satisfy the changing aspirations of young soldiers whilst continuing to justify that the armed forces have to be different from the rest of society. We cannot do this effectively if we have not ensured that our arguments are sustainable in public. So often they are generated by a small cabal of officers who see, very clearly, the military implications, but find it difficult to conceive that there are other arguments that sound even more plausible in the cold light of the television interview. The British Army has consistently failed to get its message across to the public over many of the important issues of ethos, and will not do so until the whole area is approached in a more professional and dynamic way. A question has recently been posed: would Montgomery have been able to deal with the complexities of Bosnia in the way that Generals Rose and Smith have? The answer is probably no, in the same way that WG Grace would probably not have scored many, if any, runs in modern day test cricket. The ability is there, but the attitudes and experience are from a different era. But I have little doubt that had both Montgomery and Grace he been born in a later age, their innate qualities and contemporary training and experience would have allowed them to excel in their chosen professions. In conclusion, the ability to predict trends is fraught with uncertainty, but there does appear to be some justification in the view that the qualities of leadership will remain largely unchanged. However, styles of leadership have altered under the pressure of external influences, and will probably continue to do so. Therefore the solution lies in the appropriate training of existing leaders. There appears to be no requirement to recruit and select people with different qualities.