Evolving Russian Attitude to NATO and EU Enlargement: Westernisation, Europe, and the War against Terrorism

Viatcheslav Morozov, Senior Lecturer at the St. Petersburg State University.

One does not have to be an expert in Russian foreign policy to observe that Russia’s position in relation to the enlargement of NATO and the European Union has undergone dramatic changes in the last several months. Russian attitude to NATO in general has moved from hostility to genuine interest mixed with residual suspicion, and the assessment of the future enlargement is shifting accordingly. The upcoming enlargement of the EU, on the other hand, is still officially welcomed, but the Russian political elite is increasingly becoming aware of the difficulties Russia will have to face when its neighbours join the Union. This changing Russian attitude towards the parallel processes of NATO and EU enlargement is the subject of this article. Unlike most other studies of the matter, this one will focus on identity politics to look for the explanations of the Russian position and its evolution at the present stage. The method I select for dealing with identities and their transformation is discourse analysis, which has recently been elaborated and established as a distinct and, in my view, rather useful methodology1. I adopt the definition, offered by Jens Bartelson and accepted by the majority of scholars in the IR field, of discourse as “a system for the formation of statements”2. While not denying the importance of the “hard” factors (power, economic interests, etc.), discourse analysis aims at finding explanations for political acts in the language we use to talk about politics, and in the way our linguistic practices shape our understanding of social world. My basic starting point is that, before trying to evaluate Russia’s stance as regards the enlargement, we have to find out what “Russia” means for the majority of the authorised speakers3, of those entitled to speak either on behalf of the Russian state or as experts possessing some socially significant knowledge. It is not the same whether we assess the possible consequences of both enlargements for Russia defined as a great power with a mission to stop the spread of the western influence, or identified as an integral part of the “civilised world”. In particular, I find the notion of Europe as a friendly Other very important for the definition of Russian identity, and I therefore to a large extent build my analysis upon an examination of the role the idea of Europe in the Russian discourse and of its interaction with other concepts. This article does not aim at a comprehensive review of the Russian discussion or of all the issues relevant for Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU in view of the future enlargement of both organisations. I will instead concentrate on the distinctive features of the Russian discourse about the outside world that are important for our understanding of the Russian reaction and, accordingly, for making informed political choices in the future. On the other hand, in order to achieve this goal, I have to touch upon some of the issues not directly related to the topic of the article, such as various aspects of the war against terrorism.

Russia and the Enlarging NATO: Uncertain Identity and the Fear of Westernisation

To begin with, it is necessary to consider the reasons for Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement – one of the most significant international controversies in Europe during the last decade. There are several major discourses present in Russian society, and they all offer different pictures of the Self and the Other, on the basis of which Russian societal identity is formed. However, the most widespread is the view that the world is formed by cultures, nations, civilisations, rather than independent individuals. The dominant Russian discourse (Ted Hopf calls it “liberal essentialist”4) has a very strong appreciation of an individual’s national identity: a person is understood first and foremost through her belonging to a nation, human existence acquires its full value only through membership in a wider community, and therefore the meaning of history “consists in preserving the identity of a given subject – of a people”5. This discourse treats individual freedom and intra-societal diversity with suspicion, but values very high the multiplicity of cultures in the world. This Hegelian worldview is by no means unique for Russia, but its impact on the political practice in this case is really impressive. In particular, the conservative Russian political philosophers have produced a very sophisticated and comprehensive framework for the analysis of international relations, which goes far beyond geopolitics in combining classical German idealism with the philosophy of life as well as with clear references to the post-modernist philosophy. As a result, Russia’s position vis-à-vis the West and international institutions is to a great extent shaped by the concept of westernisation and the danger of entropy it brings with itself. It is assumed that the Western civilisation has the ambition of remodelling the entire world according to its own notions of good and bad. If this universalising project is allowed to succeed, the sources of human energy in the world will be exhausted, and entropy will prevail6.

In this context, the Russian elite often sees the Russian culture as the key stronghold against entropy, and the Russian state is therefore called upon to resist westernisation at all costs, since the process constitutes an existential threat not only to the Russian culture, but to the mankind as a whole. The process of NATO enlargement is equalled to the progress of westernisation for three reasons. Firstly, NATO is perceived as one of the main institutional embodiments of the West. Secondly, in Kosovo NATO has allegedly shown its disrespect of state sovereignty as the key principle of international law and one of the main safeguards against Western preponderance in the world. The third reason is the importance of territory for Russia’s identity and for the foreign policy thinking. The phrase “not a single inch of our soil will we give to the enemy” is an essential part of all the heroic historical narratives – be it about resisting the German crusaders, Napoleon, or Hitler. Very important tool in conceptualising territory in international affairs is of course geopolitics, and this results in the Eastern boundary of NATO being interpreted in geopolitical terms as the frontline between the Eurasian and the Atlantic worlds. In broader historiosophical terms, however, this it is described as the boundary between diversity and entropy, between the good and the evil forces. This latter variant of terminology is of course rare in applied IR studies and political statements, but the arguments used by analysts and policy makers to substantiate their geopolitical concerns usually proceed exactly from these assumptions. These are the basic building blocks of the dominant foreign policy discourse. To understand why it occupies such a dominant position, however, one has to turn to historic explanations. Johan Matz has shown how after the break-up of the Soviet Union, in a situation of acute identity crisis, Russian policy makers chose to define Russia as “the Continuer-state” of the USSR and thus as a great power, and how this immediately made them vulnerable to the challenge of the nationalists7. This identity, fixed in the discursive structure as early as 1992–3, predetermined the defensive nature of the foreign policy discourse: if, indeed, Russia is simply the present-day USSR, it can be defined only in opposition to the West, its institutions (such as NATO) and values. What follows is that Russia is a weakened and weakening USSR, which predetermines a defensive position and provides plenty of openings for turning identity into a referential object of security discourse. In sum, Russian opposition to NATO enlargement has been driven by much deeper concerns than the “technical” issues of military security. Russia is a society uncertain about its new post-Soviet identity, and the fear of losing distinctive features that constitute the very core of “Russianness”, the feeling of community, of “we-ness”, has been extremely strong. The North Atlantic Alliance, for its part, has been perceived as the key instrument of this totalising westernisation, of bringing the diversity of cultures in the world to a sort of a lowest common denominator. The change of the Russian position has therefore required first of all an increase in self-confidence among Russian political elite and in the society as a whole. Viewed in this light, the creation of the new NATO – Russia Council may indeed be taken to signify the end of the Cold War and a completely new turn in Russia’s attitude towards the West. Without trying to downgrade the importance of this event, however, one should warn against premature optimism, which may lead to severe disappointment when one suddenly stumbles upon some of the “old” issues that remain on the agenda. But before turning to these “new old” issues, let us briefly look into Russia’s attitude to the enlargement of the European Union. Despite its being a very different story, it is still inextricably linked to the same crucial problems, which have to do with the Russian images of the world, of Russia itself and, in this case, of Europe as an important part of Russian identity.

Russia and the EU: Partnership under Strain

Russia’s attitude to the enlargement of the European Union has from the very beginning proceeded from the assumptions very unlike those valid for the discourse about NATO. While the North Atlantic alliance figures in the Russian discourse as an embodiment of the West and a docile instrument of the US, the European Union is usually taken as an incarnation of the idea of Europe – a concept that has much more positive connotations. Even during the Soviet era, the Soviet propaganda preferred to depict the European Communities as a sort of “false” Europe8, a capitalist bloc acting against the true interests of Europe and its peoples. “Europe” thus remained a positive marker, and in part for this reason it was so easy for Gorbachev to sell to the Soviet public his idea of a “common European home”. When the Soviet ideology was finally discarded in the early 1990s, it was only natural to associate the positive idea of Europe with European integration and its most visible manifestation – the European Communities. In a way, the (Western) European integration was contrasted to the post-Soviet disintegration, and the EU’s success has become even more visible against the background of the failures of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This positive interpretation of the EU has proven so powerful that it has survived into the twenty-first century, despite the unwillingness of the Union to open up its markets to the Russian exporters, its criticism against Russia for the two Chechen campaigns, and the development of the military capabilities, which could theoretically have lead to drawing parallels with NATO. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the new barriers likely to be created as a result of the EU expansion will be much more sensible for Russia than the purely symbolic consequences of the enlargement of the North Atlantic alliance, but the Russian attitude towards the Union has become less enthusiastic, more cautious, but still explicitly friendly. My tentative explanation of this phenomenon would consist in pointing out that isolation from the rest of the continent, the prospect “to find itself in the backyard of Europe”9 is one of the fears most widely shared in Russian society. In Russia, as in many other countries, “[i]t is a crucial part of any foreign policy vision [...] to imagine a Europe compatible with a vision of the nation/state in question”10. It is therefore essential for the foreign policy makers to always have a “true” partner in Europe, an actor that can be described as friendly and willing to engage in a constructive relationship with Russia. The EU has come closest to this definition nearly always since the break-up of the Soviet Union and until the recent rapprochement between Russia and NATO.

The improvement of the NATO - Russia relations, on the other hand, comes at the moment when the partnership with the EU is being seriously tested. The consequences of the future enlargement of the Union have by now been fully recognised by the policy makers both in Moscow and in Brussels, not least because of the Kaliningrad issue. The trickiest problem is of course the freedom of movement of persons: at the Moscow summit in the end of May, the EU rejected the Russian proposal to provide for visa-free corridors between the Kaliningrad oblast and the mainland Russia. The determination of the Union’s officials to preserve the uniformity of the Schengen rules is understandable from an insider’s viewpoint, but very difficult to sell to the public, especially in the countries whose citizens are worst affected by the EU visa policy. It is very easy to interpret to the effect that the Russia is still unwelcome in the Wider Europe: while the Union is preparing to open its doors to the new members, the former countries of the Soviet bloc, the problems of the Russian citizens are allegedly considered of secondary importance. Russian understanding is summarised in the following quote from the liberal newspaper Kommersant: “If the transit from the mainland Russia to Kaliningrad and back is not permitted, it means that the concept of a single Europe does not apply to Russia”11. This interpretation, if allowed to prevail, will appeal to several sensitive themes of the Russian foreign policy debate. The first and the vulnerable spot is the fear of being isolated from Europe, mentioned earlier. The second concern is a sort of conspiracy theory about the possible loss of Kaliningrad through its takeover by, for example, Germany, or through its transformation into an independent fourth Baltic State, member of the EU. While people taking seriously the possibility of a German revanche mostly belong to the nationalist camp, the anxiety about Kaliningrad breaking away from Russia and going over to the EU is voiced even by the most liberal politicians12. This is also connected with the general discussion about Kaliningrad’s dependence on the transit through the Lithuanian or Polish territory, which is construed almost exclusively in terms of a zero-sum game. The possibility of a positive interdependence, at least in this case, is a non-option for the dominant Russian discourse, and the possibility of an “energy blockade”, for instance, is considered so seriously that it has been decided to build a new power station in the exclave, despite the fact that much cheaper solutions are available13. Not surprisingly, the future EU enlargement figures within this discourse as “a political catalyst of the danger that threatens Kaliningrad”, and makes “the external attempts to assimilate the territory of the Kaliningrad oblast ever more evident”14. There are also other discomforting aspects, such as bitter feelings about the former “younger brothers” joining an exclusive club which will remain closed for Russia in the foreseeable future. The refusal to recognise the market status of the Russian economy has also been a clear example of what the Russian commentators would describe as cynical protectionist policy of the Union, masked with fine words about partnership.

However, an encouraging sign is that the top leadership of the country is trying to promote a much less alarmist and more constructive vision: thus, President Putin stated at the special Security Council meeting on Kaliningrad in July 2001 that the problem constitutes not only a challenge, but also “a real chance to work out a model of Russia’s interaction with Europe”15. Very much will depend on which of the two trends prevails in the wider discussion. If the problems that Russia is facing in connection with the EU enlargement cause a reconceptualisation of this process in terms of geopolitics and spheres of influence, the Union itself will inevitably be reinterpreted as a part and an instrument of the West. Accordingly, the EU enlargement will be viewed as an element of westernisation, with all the its negative value load. At this particular conjuncture of international political developments, such a reconceptualisation will be even easier to achieve because of the radical improvement in the relations between Russia and NATO: at the moment, there is a “true” and friendly partner in the West, and the prospect of a complete isolation from Europe looks very remote. It is interesting that the Commission has described its decision to grant Russia the status of a market economy, announced at the Moscow summit, as “the further step in shedding the economic baggage of the cold war”16. This is a clear parallel to the rhetoric used at the Russia – NATO summit a day earlier, and clear evidence that the EU is aware of its being at the moment relatively out of favour with the Russian policy-makers, and even jealous to the North Atlantic Alliance. I would not argue that there is a realistic possibility of a complete breakdown in Russia - EU relations: too much has been achieved in the recent years to be easily disposed of just because of a momentary political whim. Yet the change of the general tone of the Russian debate about European integration may have serious consequences for the mutual understanding in the future. And mutual understanding and preparedness to engage in non-zero sum games will be crucial for the development of the partnership in the coming years, when such ambitions formulae as common European economic space will begin to be filled with real content.

Russia, Europe, and the War against Terrorism

It can be argued that there are also other factors that may contribute to downgrading the EU in the Russian discourse back to the position of a “false Europe”. In order to make this statement clear, one has to explore the wider debate about the Russia’s role in the post-September 11 world. It may seem that the discursive structure of Russian society has undergone dramatic changes in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States. The tone of most statements about the West has indeed become much more amiable, and superficial analysis may even show that there is a greater degree of consensus about the values usually labelled “Western” or “European”. Instead of the NATO missiles, there is now another threat in the offing, not really new, but newly overwhelming, - the threat of international terrorism. Even before 11 September, this threat had been an almost self-evident part of the Russian picture of the world, since Chechnya and Islamic extremism had been present as a threatening Other in the Russian discourse since at least 1994. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the events of 11 September have had a great impact on the Russian society and lead to a re-evaluation of many assumptions about global politics. For the first time in its recent history, Russia can get a feeling of being united with the “civilised world” in its fight against terrorism. Note that this change of perception does not require Western support for the Russian campaign in Chechnya - it is enough that the critical Western voices are silenced or ignored, while the “real” international politics becomes centred on building an anti-terrorist coalition. Even this change of emphasis makes the image of the West as an enemy redundant and improper for the Russian discussion. Thus, there is indeed a historic possibility to change the mapping of the European security structures and to finally do away with the Cold War dividing lines. In the contemporary discourse, NATO enlargement is less and less linked with westernisation and all the historiosophical concerns described above, and thus is no longer interpreted as a threat to the identity of Russian society. When the Russian policy makers start to take problems at their face value, and analyse NATO enlargement as a straightforward military security problem, they have to recognise that there are other, much more urgent challenges. Judging by the interview with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, published on the eve of the Rome summit, the Russian opposition to the enlargement has all but slumped. He still described the enlargement as “a certain inertia of the approaches which have been characteristic for the Cold War period”, but did not explicitly state any opposition to the plan17. Some of the Russian analysts even begin to see positive aspects in the enlargement process. Thus, it has been repeatedly observed that Russia’s relations with Poland have dramatically improved since the latter joined the alliance, and some positive developments are discerned in the Baltic States’ policy towards the Russian- speaking minorities.

It is, however, fairly easy to misinterpret the changes of the Russian position by disregarding crucial nuances. First of all, it should be observed that, regardless of what has been the “real” motivation of President Putin and his team, the main trend in the wider discourse has been not towards greater solidarity with the US and the West as a whole, but towards a re-assertion of the Russian position at the world stage, while the position itself has not changed. It is the West that has allegedly taken up a new attitude towards Russia, and this change has confirmed, in the eyes of the Russian public, that the Russian policy in Chechnya, for example, has been a right one. From within the dominant Russian discourse, it looks as if the West, as it were, has become more “Russian”, and not vice versa. The analysis of the dominant Russian foreign policy discourse at the several stages of its evolution after the war in Kosovo18 demonstrates a profound consistency and continuity. An important feature of the discourse is the shifting boundary between “us” and “them”, between the good and evil forces, which, despite all its fluctuations, always puts the Russian state and/or the Russian people in the centre of the “good” world. Accordingly, any criticism of Russia’s conduct on the most sensitive issues - such as, first of all, Chechnya - leads to an immediate repositioning of the boundary, so that the opponent becomes part of the Other that is distinctive first of all by being anti-Russian. This discursive practice results in an increasing self-assertion of the Russian foreign policy elite at the time of “peace” (when, as in the end of 2001, the Russian policy-makers feel supported by the international community), or in the increasing feeling of existential insecurity at the time when Russia comes under strong criticism (as in late 1999) or just under a renewed scrutiny (as in early 2002) on the part of international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). The new boundary between “us” and “them”, being drawn in the post- September 11 world, sets the terrorists against the rest of the world. Viewed in this light, the new assertiveness of the Russian discourse consists in presenting Russia as the centre of struggle against the new violent Other, while the West is faced with a choice in a manner strongly resembling the new favourite formula of President Bush: “either you are with us, or your are against us”. This position had for a long time existed in the background of the discourse: Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, for example, as early as in March 2001, at the height of the conflict in Macedonia, urged Europe to follow the example of Russia, Yugoslavia and Israel and to understand that, in the fight against terrorism, “it is not a question of comfort, but of survival”19. After the 11 September attacks and the change of the Western priorities, Russian politicians use every opportunity to insist on Russia’s pre-eminence in the war against terrorism. Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, speaking in Rome at the conference of NATO defence ministers, insisted that if today “somebody still finds it beneficial to render “hearty welcome” to representatives of the Chechen terrorist groups [...] all the talking about our unity and solidarity may remain ‘empty words’”20. The message is quite straightforward: either you accept that Russia’s conduct in Chechnya is right and refuse to deal with separatists, or you become one of them, end up on the other side of the boundary separating the Good from the Evil.

Ambassador Vadim Lukov makes an even more explicit claim to the same effect: “The operation in Afghanistan should after all open the eyes of the western politicians at the actual underlying reasons of the current events in Chechnya. Now, only the inveterate russophobes can keep referring to the Chechen militants as a ‘national liberation movement’”21. Note how this statement not only asserts the alleged transformation of the position of the West, but also pre-empts any objections by classifying all the remaining opponents of the Russian policy as “inveterate russophobes”. Viewed in this light, it should be understandable why the persistence of the western leaders and international bodies like PACE in demanding a peaceful solution to the Chechen conflict was met first with surprise and then with disappointment. It was interpreted to the effect that even the fight against terrorism was not taken seriously by the western politicians: “after the first shock [of 11 September] had passed, the thesis about the necessity and irreversibility of the new approach to terrorism began to be slowly but steadily removed into [the field of] political rhetoric, less and less connected with the practical international actions”22. One possible contradiction between Russia and the West thus has already shown itself up in the Russian discussion – the question of Chechnya and, in general, of human rights in international politics. It remains to be seen how far the leaders of the EU and NATO member states are ready to go to accommodate Russia’s insistence on treating the separatist movement in Chechnya as part of the violent terrorist Other. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, for instance, in his interview published in Russia on the day of the Rome summit, put the Chechen rebels on par with the organisers of 11 September attacks by describing the former as a branch of the global terrorist network23. Such an acquiescence may paradoxically lead even to some positive consequences for the general development of Russian democracy: at least, human rights and individual freedoms will no longer be considered as a Trojan horse offered by the West, which increases chances for them to be treated as an internal need of Russian society. Yet the prospects for a peaceful settlement in Chechnya itself will probably deteriorate, should the West adopt such a policy.

In addition to that, the new partnership between Russia and the West is also prone to be interpreted in Huntingtonian terms, as an alliance of the North against the South and of Christianity against Islam. The powerful trend of the Russian discourse to always put Russia in the position of a “true” European, combined with the need to legitimise the continuing Chechen campaign, makes this interpretation even more valid in the eyes of the Russian public. The anxieties about societal identity, still widespread among the Russians, also tend to be projected to Western Europe, which is increasingly portrayed as a civilisation threatened by the intrusion of aliens from the South. In this connection, Russian commentators have shown some understanding of the slogans put forward by such figures as Jean Marie Le Pen: while not supporting him openly, they accepted his agenda as valid and predicted that in the end the Europeans might have to use his methods to protect their identity against erosion24. Most typical in this respect, however, are the comments about the situation in the Middle East. European Union’s critical attitude to the Israeli military actions on the West Bank during the spring 2002 has been interpreted by some Russian observers as “an attempt to impose upon Israel a capitulation before the Palestinian terrorists”, which might in the end lead as far as to the “destruction of Israel”. Instead of the declared concern about the suffering of the Palestinian people, the “real” motive behind the Union’s policy is its aspiration, “in alliance with the Islamic extremists” and with the help of the oil and gas resources of the Middle East, “to become a global power centre commensurable with the US”25. The most disturbing, though, is the fact that the author in fact equates the Palestinian people with the extremists and constructs an image of the Islamic world as a threatening Other, which is dangerous for both Russia and Europe. The lack of foresight, manifest in the European politicians’ naïve intention to use the extremists and then to put them under control, proves that they are unable to take care of the real interests of Europe and its peoples. What we see in this case is an obvious image of a “false Europe”, which can be used as a background to once again assert Russia’s role as a true defender of the European values. The conclusion is that the new opening in the East-West relationship comes at a high cost, and we should not forget about this while speaking about the new opportunities for European security. This cost is even higher than the thousands of lives lost as a result of the terrorist acts and the ensuing war. There is a real danger of constructing a new global conflict through stigmatising certain cultures and/or parts of the world as homes of international terrorism. Unfortunately, due to its new aspiration to become a leader of the global struggle against terrorism, Russia may contribute to this stigmatisation.

Conclusion

The Russian attitude to the future enlargement of NATO and the European Union is driven by similar logic, but different assumptions about the nature of the two organisations have lead to different outcomes. NATO has been perceived as the most clear embodiment of the West and as organisation controlled by the US, which makes it easy to portray the enlargement of the alliance in geopolitical terms as an expansion of the Atlantic world, and in historiosophical terms as a success of total westernisation. The EU, on the contrary, has been closely associated with the idea of Europe, and therefore the discussion on the issue of enlargement has in this case been much more down to earth and shown much less nervousness. Moreover, the Russian fear of isolation from Europe has contributed to this positive attitude, since the EU has been the actor that has been the easiest to portray as a true partner of Russia, and thus the Russian image of a friendly Europe has been built around the EU. However, some dramatic changes in the discourse have occurred in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US. The most widespread interpretation of 11 September in Russia has been that it has confirmed that Russia was right in using all available means to fight terrorism in Chechnya. This self-assertive interpretation made Russian foreign policy more confident and greatly contributed to the improvement of the relations between Russia and the West in general, and in particular of those with the North Atlantic alliance. Russia has become less worried about the alleged threats to its societal identity coming from the West, and seemingly made the West accept its own reading of the key global security challenges. On the other hand, Russia – EU relations have entered the most difficult stage of preparations for the future enlargement of the Union, epitomised by the problem of Kaliningrad. The combination of these two factors has lead to a repositioning of both organisations in the Russian discourse: NATO has become an ally, although still viewed with suspicion, and the EU has come under criticism, albeit remaining an important partner.

If we want the current rapprochement between Russia and the West to turn into a long-term reconfiguration without producing new civilisational divides, we should take care of at least two important things. First of all, a reinterpretation of the EU enlargement in geopolitical terms should be prevented. Even if not every compromise on Kaliningrad and other issues is possible, Russia should not feel excluded from the process of shaping the future of Europe. It is the responsibility of politicians and analysts from both Russia, the EU and the candidate countries to refrain from using various kinds of conspiracy theories as easy explanations of the remaining disagreements, and to concentrate on the real problems of the residents of the Kaliningrad oblast and of other Russian citizens. Second task is to take utmost care when dealing with terrorism, its definition and origins. It is unfortunately highly probable that when using this historic opportunity to destroy the remaining walls in Europe, we will make a historic mistake by building a new wall against a new Other – the Islamic world, and the South in general. My deep conviction is that stigmatising Islam and/or the South should be avoided at all cost. The paranoiac pursuit of absolute security will inevitably polarise the world and split the societies in the North, including such multi-confessional country as Russia. In the end, we will end up in a much less secure world, since poverty and exclusion are, in the final analysis, precisely the causes of international terrorism.